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Descartes is not widely recognized for his ethics; indeed, most readers are unaware that he 
had an ethics. However, Descartes placed great importance on his ethics, claiming that ethics is 
the highest branch of his philosophical system. I aim to understand the systematic relationship 
Descartes envisions between his ethics and the rest of his philosophy, particularly his 
metaphysics and epistemology. I defend three main theses. First, I argue against the recent trend 
in the literature that claims that the chief virtue in Descartes’ ethics—generosity—is acquired in 
the Meditations. On this view, the presence of moral virtue in the Meditations shows that ethical 
practice is intertwined with metaphysics and epistemology. I argue that generosity cannot be 
acquired in the Meditations because acquiring generosity presupposes several metaphysical and 
physical truths that the meditator cannot access given her epistemic position. Thus, I maintain 
that metaphysics and epistemology is foundational to ethics. Second, I resolve the tension 
between Descartes’ description of distinct virtues, and his insistence that there is only a single 
virtue—the disposition to judge well. Drawing from his theory of conceptual distinction in his 
metaphysics, I argue that Descartes offers a unique account of the unity of the virtues. Although 
Descartes describes different virtues, he thinks that all of them are identical to each other because 
they are reducible to the disposition to judge well. Nonetheless, we can conceptually distinguish 
between the virtues because we can regard the disposition to judge well in different ways given 
the various applications it has in different types of moral situations. Third, I show that some of 
Descartes’ ethical concepts inform his epistemology. I draw from Descartes’ theory of virtue to 
address “the problem of knowledge preservation,” that is, how to render perfect knowledge—
scientia—stable in light of the instability of clear and distinct perceptions. I argue that Descartes 





habits of belief are established through repeated engagement with cognitive routes to clear and 
distinct perceptions, and are ultimately grounded in memory. This reading has the advantage of 








Descartes is not usually recognized as an ethicist by contemporary commentators. Indeed, his 
peers in the early modern period didn’t seem to recognize him as much of an ethicist either. 
Leibniz, for example, claimed that “Descartes has not much advanced the practice of morality” 
(AG: 241). As the traditional story goes, Descartes is the father of modern philosophy because he 
revolutionized the Scholastic framework for understanding the metaphysical and natural world, 
which undoubtedly still has ripples of influence to this day. Descartes’ ethics, the thought goes, 
is merely a side project or an afterthought to his more prominent metaphysical, epistemological, 
and scientific system. Though it is indeed true that Descartes was not as influential an ethicist as 
he was a metaphysician and epistemologist, I contend that this standard view does not accurately 
capture how Descartes viewed himself qua philosopher and his philosophical system.  
Descartes never wrote a proper treatise dedicated to ethics. In a letter to Chanut, Descartes 
expresses his reservations about writing about ethics: 
It is true that normally I refuse to write down my thoughts concerning morality. I 
have two reasons for this. One is that there is no other subject in which malicious 
people can so readily find pretexts for vilifying me; and the other is that I believe 
only sovereigns, or those authorized by them, have the right to concern 
themselves with regulating the morals of other people. (AT V: 86–7/CSMK: 326) 
 
Despite these reservations, Descartes did write about ethics, and his ethical writings are spread 
throughout his corpus and correspondence. Descartes’ initial concern with ethics actually emerge 
right at the foundations of his philosophical project. In the Discourse on Method, Descartes 
outlines a method for pursuing true knowledge. The essence of the method is a skeptical stance 






Never to accept anything as true if I did not have evident knowledge of its truth: 
that is, carefully to avoid precipitate conclusions and preconceptions, and to 
include nothing more in my judgements than what presented itself to my mind so 
clearly and so distinctly that I had no occasion to doubt it. (AT VI: 18/CSM I: 
120) 
 
This methodic doubt, however, raises a problem for the “conduct of life,” that is, one’s 
practical actions. It seems that we cannot attain clear and distinct perceptions concerning 
practical affairs (at least not until true and certain first principles have been established), 
thus we ought not undertake practical actions. Noticing this problem, Descartes claims 
that we should take up a “provisional morality” [morale par provision] until we can find 
certain principles in philosophy:  
Now, before starting to rebuild your house, it is not enough simply to pull it 
down, to make provision for materials and architects (or else train yourself in 
architecture), and to have carefully drawn up the plans; you must also provide 
yourself with some other place where you can live comfortable while building is 
in progress. Likewise, I should remain indecisive in my actions while reason 
obliged me to be so in my judgements, and in order to live as happily as I could 
during this time, I formed for myself a provisional moral code consisting of just 
three or four maxims. (AT VI: 24/CSM I: 122). 
 
Descartes’ provisional morality consists of the following four maxims. Roughly: 
 
(1) To obey the laws and customs of one’s country, and to follow God’s religion. 
(2) To be firm and decisive in one’s actions 
(3) To try to master oneself, and change one’s desires instead of the world 
(4) To choose the best occupation 
Though the provisional morality is not a fully fleshed out ethics, these maxims are indeed 
ethical in nature, and serve as a temporary guide for the conduct of life.1 Arguably, the 
                                                             
1 At first glance, these maxims might not seem to constitute a view on morality. 
However, on closer inspection one can see the seeds of a theory of virtue, the passions, 




most important maxim of the provisional morality is the second maxim, as it sketches out 
a preliminary account of virtue. As Descartes writes about the second maxim: 
Since our will tends to pursue or avoid only what our intellect represents as good 
or bad, we need only to judge well in order to act well, and to judge as well as we 
can in order to do our best—that is to say, in order to acquire all the virtues and in 
general all the other goods we can acquire. And when we are certain of this, we 
cannot fail to be happy. (AT VI: 28/CSM I: 125) 
 
Descartes will expand upon this maxim in later writings as he develops his virtue theory.2 
Later in his career, Descartes implies that he has moved past this provisional morality, and 
has established (or at least is seeking to establish) a perfect moral system. In the Preface to the 
French edition of the Principles of Philosophy Descartes represents his philosophical system 
with the image of a tree: 
The whole of philosophy is like a tree. The roots are metaphysics, the trunk is 
physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences, 
which may be reduced to three principal ones, namely medicine, mechanics and 
morals. By ‘morals’ (la morale) I understand the highest and most perfect moral 
system, which presupposes a complete knowledge of the other sciences and is the 
ultimate level of wisdom.  (AT IXB: 15/CSM I: 186) 
 
Descartes’ provisional morality shows that Descartes has some interest in ethics. However, this 
interest could still be interpreted as a non-fundamental part of his philosophical project. Having a 
provisional morality might be something we just accept in order to keep us grounded while we 
search for the truth. But, the thought goes, the search for true and certain principles does not 
encompass a search for a true ethics. The image of the tree of philosophy puts pressure on such a 
reading. The tree implies that morality is a central part of Descartes’ philosophical system. 
                                                             
2 Some commentators have argued that Descartes’ mature ethics is a reiteration of the provisional 
morality (Cimakasy and Polansky, 2012). In this dissertation I will not directly take a stance on 
this issue. However, while I do think that Descartes’ mature ethics is consistent with the 
provisional morality, I think that Descartes’ mature ethics is more extensive and developed than 
the provisional morality. For more on Descartes’ provisional morality see Morgan (1994, 39-64) 




Indeed, it is the highest part of the system. On this view, metaphysics, epistemology, physics, 
and so on are fundamental to Descartes’ philosophy.3 But at the end of the day, it is just that: 
fundamental. Or to use more familiar Cartesian language: it is foundational. But foundational to 
what? If we take Descartes’ representation of his philosophical system in the image of the tree of 
philosophy seriously, then we must reconsider—seriously—our understanding of him as the 
paradigmatic metaphysician and epistemologist. For metaphysics and epistemology are 
ultimately foundational to Descartes’ real philosophical goal: the establishment of a perfect 
moral system (la morale). 
Indeed, la morale is not on a par with the other parts of philosophy. As Descartes continues: 
Now just as it is not the roots or the trunk of a tree from which one gathers fruit, 
but only the ends of the branches, so the principal part of philosophy depends on 
those parts of it which can only be learn last of all. (AT IXB: 15/CSM I: 186) 
 
Ethics is not just a branch of philosophy, it also provides the fruits of philosophy itself.  These 
fruits are the “principal part of philosophy.” 
 What is the perfect moral system that Descartes envisions? And how is it grounded in the rest 
of Descartes’ philosophical system? Descartes never explicitly lays out his perfect moral system. 
However, in his writings and correspondence after the French Preface Descartes starts to tackle 
some fundamental moral concepts, such as virtue, the good, happiness, and the passions. Though 
not decisive, these writings give us a sense of what Descartes’ moral system might be. Much of 
Descartes’ ethical views comes in the context of his correspondence with Princess Elizabeth of 
Bohemia and the Passions of the Soul (written in response to many of Princess Elizabeth’s 
queries). The focus of the correspondence is the nature of virtue and the requirements for virtue. 
In the Passions of the Soul, Descartes addresses the relationship between virtue, happiness, and 
                                                             
3 “the first part of philosophy is metaphysics, which contains the principles of knowledge” (AT 




the passions. These writings suggest that ethics was an important subject for Descartes, and that 
he was making strides towards fleshing out his full moral system.  
The general focus on virtue in these writings suggests that at the heart of Descartes’ moral 
system is a theory of virtue. As Descartes claims, virtue is the supreme good:  
I make a distinction between the supreme good—which consists in the exercise of 
virtue, or, what comes to the same, the possession of all those goods whose 
acquisition depends upon our free will—and the satisfaction of mind which 
results from that acquisition.  (AT IV: 305/CSMK: 268) 
 
What is Cartesian virtue? Descartes gives varying definitions throughout the correspondence and 
the Passions. In many texts, he identifies virtue with the firm and constant resolution to use free 
will well, and he often identifies virtue with the second maxim of the provisional morality.  In 
other texts, he distinguishes between different types of virtue, such as generosity, courage, and 
humility. Though Descartes is not unequivocal about the nature of virtue, what is clear is that 
pursuing and exercising virtue is the primary task of the moral agent, and that if she is successful 
in exercising virtue she will attain happiness and mastery of her passions. To acquire virtue, 
Descartes claims in some texts that we must possess “knowledge of the truth” (AT IV: 
291/CSMK: 265). Such knowledge ranges from truths of metaphysics, physics, society, and 
politics. These epistemic requirements give us a clue as to how Descartes’ ethics is supposed to 
be grounded in the rest of his metaphysical system. We must have knowledge of metaphysics, 
physics, and so on not only to establish a perfect moral system, but to practice it as well.  
In this dissertation, my aim is to make some progress toward understanding Descartes’ 
perfect moral system, as presented in his later ethical writings, by examining his theory of virtue, 
and how it relates to his metaphysics and epistemology. I aim to answer three main questions:  
(1) What is the relationship between the chief Cartesian virtue—generosity—and Descartes’ 




(2) What is the nature of Cartesian virtue, and does Cartesian virtue allow for the possibility 
of moral knowledge? 
(3) Does Descartes’ ethics inform his metaphysical and epistemological project in any way? 
The dissertation is divided into three chapters, each of which answers one of the above 
questions. In the first chapter, “Generosity, the Cogito, and the Fourth Meditation,” I examine 
the relationship between the virtue of generosity and metaphysical knowledge. In attempting to 
place ethics in its rightful place within Descartes’ philosophical system, several commentators 
have tried to show that ethics is foundational to Descartes’ philosophical system because virtue is 
intertwined with metaphysics. On this view, ethics is not just the highest branch of philosophy, 
but it is the root of philosophy as well. Lisa Shapiro, for example, has argued that the chief virtue 
in Descartes’ ethics, generosity, is acquired by the meditator in the Fourth Meditation. The virtue 
of generosity, according to Descartes, consists of two components: (1) the knowledge that free 
will is the only thing that truly belongs to us, and (2) the firm and constant resolution to use free 
will well. In the Fourth Meditation, the meditator seems to achieve both components upon 
arriving at knowledge of her free will, and resolving to use it well by only affirming her clear 
and distinct perceptions. Omri Boehm, on the other hand, has argued that generosity is 
foundational to the cogito of the Second Meditation. According to Boehm, the cogito 
presupposes an affirmation of one’s freedom, i.e. the first component of generosity. I argue that 
both readings are problematic, precisely because generosity in part presupposes the metaphysical 
knowledge offered in the Meditations on First Philosophy. For example, I argue that the virtue of 
generosity presupposes knowledge of the mind-body distinction. The meditator, however, cannot 
have such knowledge in the Second or Fourth Meditations because the real distinction is not 




presupposes knowledge of other truths the meditator cannot have access to, such as knowledge 
of physics and one’s metaphysical standing in the universe. The upshot of my reading of 
generosity is that ethics is indeed the highest branch of philosophy, and presupposes (some) 
knowledge of the other parts of philosophy. 
In the Second Chapter, “Descartes on the Unity of the Virtues,” I offer a new reading of 
Descartes’ virtue theory. In particular, I reconcile the tension between Descartes’ complex 
conception of virtue and his simple conception of virtue. In some texts, Descartes claims that 
there are many virtues (generosity, courage, humility, etc.), while in other texts he claims that 
there is only one virtue (i.e. the virtue of judging well). I argue for a metaphysically simple 
account of virtue, according to which that there is only one virtue, that is, the disposition to judge 
well. However, there still remains a multiplicity of virtues, as we can regard this one virtue in 
many different ways based on the kind of situation in which it is exercised. This reading has 
some significant payoffs beyond reconciling the metaphysical tension in Descartes’ virtue 
theory. In particular, it gives us an account of Descartes’ moral epistemology. I argue that 
Descartes’ theory of virtue presupposes that moral knowledge is possible. This puts pressure on 
the standard reading that knowledge can only be grounded in clear and distinct perceptions. 
In the Third Chapter, “Descartes on the Problem of Knowledge Preservation” I offer a re-
reading of Descartes’ epistemology in light of Descartes’ theory of virtue. My aim is to offer a 
solution to an oft-neglected problem in Descartes’ epistemology, what I call the problem of 
knowledge preservation. The issue is how to preserve perfect knowledge (scientia) given that the 
judgments that amount to scientia seem to be only obtainable by being grounded in momentary 
clear and distinct perceptions. I argue that two possible solutions in the literature, the 




knowledge we ultimately have to regenerate clear and distinct perceptions through “cognitive 
routes” whenever we make a potential scientia type judgment. The regeneration solution is 
problematic because it overestimates our ability to regenerate clear and distinct perceptions; 
moreover, it lacks textual support. The memory solution argues that so long as we remember 
having clearly and distinctly perceived something, we maintain knowledge of it. The memory 
solution is problematic, however, because it presupposes that God provides a blanket guarantee 
of our memories of clear and distinct perceptions. Though these solutions fail, I argue that they 
pick up on features of Descartes’ considered view. Drawing from both solutions, I argue that 
knowledge is preserved through virtuous habits of belief. I call this view the dispositionalist 
solution. Virtuous habits of belief, I contend, are established through repeated engagement with 
cognitive routes, and are ultimately grounded in memory. Thus memory does have a role in the 
preservation of knowledge, just not in the way the memory solution initially imagined. A 
significant upshot of the dispositionalist solution is that it can salvage Descartes’ remarks about 
memory in his discussion of the Cartesian circle. Moreover, the reading shows that Descartes’ 




2  GENEROSITY, THE COGITO, AND THE FOURTH MEDITATION 
 
Previously Published as: Saja Parvizian (2016). Res Philosophica 93 (1):219-243 
 
 
1 Ethics, the Tree of Philosophy, and the Question of Systematicity 
 
Recent scholarship on Descartes’s ethics has been particularly concerned with understanding the 
systematic relationship Descartes envisions between ethics and the rest of philosophy. The 
guiding text is the famous tree of philosophy passage in the French Preface to the Principles of 
Philosophy,1 as it is one of the few places where Descartes explicitly situates ethics within his 
philosophical system:2 
The whole of philosophy is like a tree. The roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, 
and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences, which may be 
reduced to three principal ones, namely, medicine, mechanics, and morals. By ‘morals’ 
[la morale] I understand the highest and most perfect moral system, which presupposes a 
complete knowledge [présupposant une entière conaissance] of the other sciences and is 
the ultimate level of wisdom [la sagesse]. 
 Now just as it is not the roots or the trunk of a tree from which one gathers the fruit, 
but only the ends of the branches, so the principal benefit of philosophy depends on those 
parts of it which can only be learnt [apprendre] last of all. (AT IXB: 14/CSM I: 186)3 
 
Before proceeding, we must distinguish two senses of ‘ethics’ (here, ‘la morale’) at play in this 
passage and Descartes’s broader ethical writings. There is a theoretical sense of ‘la morale,’ that 
is, moral philosophy. This involves a theory of virtue, happiness, goodness, etc. Descartes clearly 
                                               
1 I employ the following abbreviations for editions of Descartes’s work: ‘AT’: Oeuvres de 
Descartes (cited by volume and page); ‘CSM’: The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vols I 
and II (cited by volume and page); ‘CSMK’: The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol III 
(cited by page).  
2 Many commentators read the tree of philosophy as a genuine representation of Descartes’s 
philosophical system. However, not everyone has read it in this way. Roger Ariew (1992), for 
example, claims that Descartes leaves out significant parts of his so-called system, such as 
mathematics, logic, and theology. Although I am in agreement with the standard view, my thesis 
is consistent with a non-systematic reading. One can agree that the practice of ethics is distinct 
from metaphysical inquiry, yet deny that ethics and metaphysics figure into a broader system.  
3 See also Early Writings AT X: 215/CSM I: 3; Rules I, AT X: 359-61/CSM I: 9-10; Letter to 
Chanut 15 June 1646, AT IV: 441/CSMK: 289.  
10 
has moral philosophy in mind when he refers to the most perfect moral system. But there is also 
a practical sense of ‘la morale,’ that is, the practice of morals. This involves the practice of 
virtue, the attainment of happiness, the pursuit of the good, etc. In the tree of philosophy, 
Descartes does not explicitly use ‘la morale’ in this sense, but he has (in part) the practice of 
morals in mind when he refers to the fruit and principal benefit of learning philosophy. For 
earlier in the French Preface he claims, “the study of philosophy is more necessary for the 
regulation of our morals [moeurs] and our conduct in this life than is the use of our eyes to guide 
our steps” (AT IXB: 3-4/CSM I: 180). The commentators I engage are primarily concerned with 
ethics understood under the practical sense. In particular, they want to know at what point virtue 
is acquired in the tree of philosophy.4 Unless otherwise noted, then, I use ‘ethics’ and related 
terms in this practical sense. 
 The standard interpretation is that the tree of philosophy represents an epistemological order 
to the attainment of virtue (Marshall 1998, 2-4, 72-4, 59-60; Morgan 1994, 204-11; Rutherford 
2004, 190).5 For example, Donald Rutherford writes that happiness and virtue “can be 
guaranteed only if reason itself has been perfected through the acquisition and proper ordering of 
intellectual knowledge” (2004, 190). Thus, on this approach, ethics is a part of Descartes’s 
                                               
4 Of course, this has implications for one’s interpretation of Descartes’s moral philosophy. 
5 These readings draw from the following sorts of texts: Rules I, AT X: 361/CSM I: 10; French 
Preface, AT IXB: 2/CSM I: 179 and AT IXB: 20/CSM I: 190; Letter to Elizabeth 4 August 1645, 
AT IV: 267/CSMK: 258; Letter to Elizabeth 15 September 1645, AT IV: 291-6/CSMK: 265-7; 
Letter to Chanut 26 February 1649, AT V: 290-1/CSMK: 368. 
11 
philosophical system because knowledge of metaphysics and the sciences is supposed to lead the 
moral agent to virtue.6  Call this the epistemological reading.7 
In a series of recent papers, Lisa Shapiro (2005; 2008a) has challenged the epistemological 
reading. Shapiro (2008a, 456-7) does not deny that knowledge of metaphysics and the sciences is 
useful for virtue. But on her view, the epistemological reading cannot adequately ground 
Descartes’s ethics within his philosophical system. For if ethics does not come into play until 
after metaphysics and the sciences have been completed, then it seems that ethics is merely 
“grafted on to a fully developed tree” (Ibid., 447). Instead, Shapiro claims that ethics is actually 
foundational to the tree of philosophy: virtue is not acquired after one completes metaphysics; 
rather, virtue contributes to metaphysics (Ibid., 459). 
Shapiro develops this reading by arguing that the meditator acquires generosity [générosité] 
in the Fourth Meditation.8 In The Passions of the Soul, Descartes claims that generosity is our 
                                               
6 The standard reading does not claim that the virtuous person must be an expert in metaphysics 
and natural philosophy. Rather, the view is that there are certain general truths of metaphysics 
and natural philosophy one must know (see section 3.2). 
7 The epistemological reading seems to have the unattractive implication that prior to Descartes’s 
metaphysical discoveries, no moral agent could have acquired virtue because nobody had access 
to the true metaphysics and natural philosophy. The thought is this: surely there have been 
courageous people prior to Descartes. There is a sense in which proponents of the 
epistemological reading have to accept this consequence: Descartes does think his predecessors 
had the wrong metaphysics, thus they could not have been virtuous. However, Descartes does 
have the resources to allow for those ignorant of the true metaphysics to possess a degree of 
virtue. According to Descartes, virtue ultimately consists in the right use of the will. Ideally, we 
will use our will according to “knowledge of what is right”, but “whereas what depends on the 
will is within the capacity of everyone, there are some people who possess far sharper 
intellectual vision than others” (Dedicatory Letter to Elizabeth, AT VIIIA: 2/CSM I: 191). Those 
who lack a sharper intellect can still be virtuous “according to their lights” so long as they “do 
their utmost to acquire knowledge of what is right, and always to pursue what they judge to be 
right” (Ibid.).  
8 Shapiro (2008a) sees herself as developing Geneviève Rodis-Lewis’s (1987) interpretation of 
generosity. As Shapiro puts it, Rodis-Lewis’s view is that “generosity is a seed-bearing fruit, and 
that seed, if properly cultivated, will grow into the tree of philosophy” (2008a, 459). 
12 
chief passion and virtue, describing it as “the key to all the virtues and a general remedy for 
every disorder of the passions” (Passions III.161, AT XI: 454/CSM I: 388). Generosity, 
[W]hich causes a person’s self-esteem to be as great as it may legitimately be, has only 
two components. The first consists in his knowing that nothing truly belongs to him but 
this freedom to dispose his volitions, and that he ought to be praised or blamed for no 
other reason than his using this freedom well or badly. The second consists in his feeling 
within himself a firm and constant resolution to use it well—that is, never to lack the will 
to undertake and carry out whatever he judges to be best. To do that is to pursue virtue in 
a perfect manner. 
(Passions III.153, AT XI: 445-6/CSM I: 384) 
 
Shapiro (2008a, 458-9) acknowledges that the two components of generosity are supposed to 
lead one to act in traditionally generous ways (e.g. to be kind, charitable, and unselfish) in the 
“conduct of life.” But she contends that they are also central to the “contemplation of truth.”9 On 
Shapiro’s reading, the two components amount to “the recognition on each of our parts that we 
have a free will, paired with the resolution to use our will well” (2005, 28; see also 2008a, 459; 
2008b, 35; 2011, 17-18). In the Fourth Meditation, the meditator satisfies these two components 
because she understands that she has a free will, and resolves to use it well by adhering to the 
method for avoiding error (Shapiro 2005, 28; 2008a, 459).  
Generosity is supposed to contribute to metaphysics in two key ways. First, it regulates the 
meditator’s disordered passions, especially her excessive desire for knowledge (Shapiro 2005, 
25-30).10 The desire for knowledge that initiates the First Meditation is excessive because the 
meditator hopes to never make a mistake again. By the end of the Fourth Meditation, however, 
the meditator desires to know that which she can know. Generosity tempers the meditator’s 
desire for knowledge by leading her to acknowledge her cognitive limitations. This change in 
                                               
9 Descartes’s distinction between the contemplation of truth and the conduct of life will be 
developed in section 3.2. For now, see Replies II, AT VII: 149/CSM II: 106.  
10 It is important to note that other commentators have also attended to the meditator’s passions, 
yet without involving generosity. See Schmitter (2002); Beardsley (2005).  
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passion is significant because it helps the meditator reconsider her metaphysical goals and 
ultimately defeat skepticism. By the end of the Sixth Meditation, the meditator no longer desires 
to have absolute certainty in all of her beliefs, thus “the exaggerated doubts of the last few days 
should be dismissed as laughable” (AT VII: 89/CSM II: 61). Second, and more significantly, the 
practice of generosity is the “key to Cartesian metaphysics and epistemology” (Shapiro 2008a, 
459). For it is by adhering to the method for avoiding error—only affirming her clear and distinct 
perceptions—that the meditator can draw the real distinction between mind and body, and prove 
the existence of an external world. On Shapiro’s reading, then, ethics is a part of Descartes’s 
philosophical system because generosity is involved in the construction of its metaphysical 
foundations. Call this the organic reading.11 12  
Shapiro (2005, 14-5) stresses that her interpretation, as it currently stands, is merely a 
suggestion and that she is not calling for a wholesale rejection of standard interpretations of 
Descartes’s metaphysics. Nonetheless, her reading is gaining traction in the recent literature. Noa 
Naaman-Zauderer confirms that generosity can be extended to “the realm of intellectual inquiry” 
(2010, 202). Omri Boehm (2014) extends this approach, arguing that generosity is actually 
                                               
11 It is important to distinguish the organic reading from the claim that Descartes’s metaphysics 
is motivated by ethical concerns. On this view, one might say that Descartes (in part) draws the 
real distinction between mind and body because it will help establish (say) the priority of 
intellectual pleasures over bodily pleasures. Though the organic reading is consistent with this 
view, Shapiro is making a stronger claim, namely, that ethics itself is involved in the 
construction of metaphysics. 
12 Morgan’s interpretation, which I have classified as standard, describes the tree of philosophy 
as organic as well: “in a living organism such as a tree, all the connected parts grow 
simultaneously, dependent upon one another….hence the basic structure of the tree, branches and 
all, is apparent at the very early stage in its development” (1994, 25). This seems to place 
Morgan in Shapiro’s camp. However, a closer reading shows that Morgan is not claiming that 
the tree is organic in virtue of (say) metaphysics involving ethics; rather, the claim is about the 
dependency relations within the tree: “the most basic conclusions in metaphysics and physics 
will shape the structure of morals” (Ibid.). 
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foundational to the cogito in the Second Meditation. Boehm claims that generosity is not an 
“ethical counterpart [of the cogito] but the ground of theoretical certainty itself.” (Ibid., 707, fn. 
9). In short, if Shapiro et al. are right, we do have to reinterpret key features of Descartes’s 
metaphysics and the Meditations more generally.13  
I am sympathetic with the recent trend of situating Descartes’s metaphysics within his moral 
project. However, I will argue that generosity does not contribute to the metaphysical 
foundations of Descartes’s system, and consequently, that we should resist the organic reading.14 
Though I will focus on Shapiro’s interpretation, my arguments are general, and thus apply to 
similar iterations in the literature (I will, however, substantially engage Boehm’s interpretation of 
the first component of generosity). There are two objections that I develop. First, I argue that the 
meditator is neither in a position to acquire generosity, nor to satisfy particular features of 
generosity, precisely because she does not know the requisite metaphysics. The claim that 
generosity contributes to our achievement of this metaphysics, then, is problematic. Second, I 
argue that in order to construe the meditator as generous, one must strip generosity of everything 
that makes it ethical in the first place. This is an impoverished conception of generosity, which 
cannot support the claim that ethics is involved in metaphysics.15  
                                               
13 As Shapiro points out, “if the meditator feels passions, and passions have a bodily cause, then 
it seems that either he is not to be thought of as a purely thinking thing or we need to reconsider 
Descartes’s notion of pure thought” (2005, 23). Boehm is also clear about the revisionary 
implications of his reading: “Freedom, not only in the moral but also in the theoretical domain, is 
the first indubitable discovery, grounding the philosopher’s assertion of his existence” (2014, 
720).  
14 I will only address Shapiro’s claim about the passions in the Meditations insofar as I am 
denying that generosity has any role in their (alleged) regulation. As I see it, there is nothing 
inconsistent about granting a role to the meditator’s passions, while denying the organic reading.  
15 It is important to keep in mind that Shapiro is using ‘ethics’ in the practical sense described 
above. Accordingly, I am only resisting the claim that ethics, in this narrower sense, is involved 
in the Meditations. Strictly speaking, my reading is consistent with allowing for certain aspects 
15 
The paper is divided up as follows. In section 2, I examine the oft-neglected method for 
acquiring generosity Descartes offers in Passions III.161, arguing that Descartes would not think 
that the Fourth Meditation could induce generosity. In section 3, I offer a new reading of the two 
components of generosity listed in Passions III.153, arguing that the meditator cannot satisfy 
either component, and by extension, that generosity cannot be practiced in the Meditations. I 
conclude in section 4 by discussing the importance of distinguishing ethics from metaphysics. 
 
2 Acquiring Generosity  
 
In Passions III.161, Descartes offers his method for acquiring generosity: 
[A] If we occupy ourselves frequently in considering the nature of free will and [B] the 
many advantages which proceed from a firm resolution to make good use of it—[C] 
while also considering, on the other hand, the many vain and useless cares which trouble 
ambitious people—[D] we may arouse the passion of generosity in ourselves and then 
acquire the virtue. (AT XI: 453-4/CSM I: 388; sections added)16 
 
We can disambiguate two meditations on the will in the method for acquiring generosity. 
Broadly construed, the first consists of frequent consideration of the nature of free will [A]. Call 
this the metaphysical meditation on the will. The second consists of frequent consideration of the 
                                               
of moral philosophy to be intertwined with metaphysics. Indeed, the meditator considers various 
moral propositions that are central to Descartes’s final moral system. For example, that the 
contemplation of God “enables us to know the greatest joy of which we are capable in this life” 
(Third Meditation, AT VII: 52/CSM II: 36), and that free will is “man’s greatest and most 
important perfection” (Fourth Meditation, AT VII: 62/CSM II: 43). (I say “considers” because it 
is unclear whether the meditator has knowledge of these moral propositions).  
16 In the beginning of Passions III.161, Descartes claims that generosity is “dependent on good 
birth” (AT XI: 453-4/CSM I: 388). This seems to suggest that, in addition to the method offered 
above, Descartes is proposing a separate “natural path” to generosity. However, as clarified in 
Comments on a Certain Broadsheet, Descartes is merely acknowledging that some people are 
born with a “tendency” to acquire generosity (AT VIIIB: 357-8/CSM I: 303-4). In short, the 
portion of Passions III.161 I have presented is Descartes’s method for acquiring generosity. For 
similar presentations of the method, see Rodis-Lewis (1987, 54); Des Chene (2012, 188); 
Naaman-Zauderer (2010, 201). 
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many advantages that proceed from a good use of the will [B], and frequent consideration of the 
disadvantages that proceed from a bad use of the will [C]. Call this the consequential meditation 
on the will. 
 Commentators arguing that generosity is present in the Meditations have a difficult 
relationship with Passions III.161. On the one hand, some commentators disregard this passage 
(e.g. Boehm). Perhaps they are motivated by Descartes’s suggestion that the method is merely a 
sufficient condition for acquiring generosity: “If [si] we occupy ourselves frequently in 
considering…we may arouse the passion of generosity in ourselves and then acquire the virtue” 
(AT XI: 453-4/CSM I: 388).17 The thought here is that whether the relevant part of the 
Meditations (i.e. the Second or Fourth Meditation) resembles Descartes’s method is irrelevant to 
the question of whether the meditator in fact acquires generosity, because the method is not 
necessary for acquiring generosity. However, disregarding the method is still problematic. 
Descartes published the Passions (1649) about eight years after the Meditations (1641). Thus, if 
he thought that the Second or Fourth Meditation were a path to generosity, presumably he would 
have indicated as much. But he does not. Thus, I think commentators owe us some explanation; 
they cannot simply ignore this central passage.  
 On the other hand, commentators who do try to account for Passions III.161 have 
problematic interpretations of the method for acquiring generosity. Consider Shapiro’s 
interpretation:  
According to Descartes, one ‘may excite in oneself the passion and then acquire the 
virtue of generosity’ just by frequently considering ‘what free will is and how great the 
advantages are that come from a firm resolution to use it well.’ (1999, 252)  
                                               
17 Strictly speaking, it is unclear whether the method even amounts to a sufficient condition for 
acquiring generosity. Descartes says the method “may” (peut) induce generosity. Perhaps he is 
being careless. Nonetheless, this passage represents his views about how generosity is acquired, 
and thus it must be taken seriously.  
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On this reading of the method, the Fourth Meditation seems to resemble the method for acquiring 
generosity. In the Fourth Meditation, the meditator investigates truth, falsity, and the source of 
her errors. A significant part of this meditation turns on understanding the nature of free will: the 
meditator learns that her false judgments arise from a misuse of her freedom, as opposed to 
deception on the part of God. In this respect, the Fourth Meditation involves something like the 
metaphysical meditation on the will. Furthermore, the meditator considers a key advantage that 
comes from using her will well: if she suspends judgment about her obscure and confused 
perceptions, and only affirms her clear and distinct ones, she can attain knowledge. In this 
respect, the Fourth Meditation involves something like the consequential meditation on the will 
as well. Thus, Shapiro’s reading seems to be in good standing. 
 Here, I will not question whether the Fourth Meditation involves something like the 
metaphysical meditation on the will.18 Instead, I want to focus on the consequential meditation 
on the will. Recall that the consequential meditation on the will involves frequent consideration 
of two things: “[B] the many advantages which proceed from a firm resolution to make good use 
of it [free will]” and “[C]…the many vain and useless cares which trouble ambitious people.” 
However, notice that Shapiro omits [C] in her rendition of the method. For Shapiro, we only 
need to reflect on the many advantages that come from using our will well. No explanation is 
offered for this omission. Perhaps it is accidental, but it certainly helps Shapiro’s case. On its 
                                               
18 Nonetheless, I would resist the claim that the metaphysical meditation on the will does occur 
in the Fourth Meditation. As I see it, the metaphysical meditation on the will involves reflection 
on our knowledge of the nature of free will. However, I do not think that in the Fourth Meditation 
the meditator can have knowledge of her free will, because she has yet to draw the real 
distinction between mind and body. As we will see below, the meditator is still unclear about 
whether she is a corporeal thing, and consequently, she cannot understand the nature of her (non-
corporeal) will.  
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own, [B] is unclear about the sorts of advantages Descartes wants us to consider, and thus admits 
of a theoretical gloss. That is, Shapiro can read [B] as claiming that we should reflect on 
theoretical advantages that come from using our will well (e.g. metaphysical knowledge). Thus it 
seems that the consequential meditation on the will does occur in the Fourth Meditation, because 
the meditator clearly considers this advantage: “I shall unquestionably reach the truth, if only I 
give sufficient attention to all the things which I perfectly understand…” (AT VII: 62/CSM II: 
43). However, when we include [C], a different reading of the consequential meditation on the 
will starts to emerge. As I will argue, far from being a meditation about theoretical advantages 
and disadvantages, the consequential meditation on the will concerns practical advantages and 
disadvantages. 
Let us reconsider the consequential meditation on the will, then, by first examining the 
disadvantages mentioned in [C]. Descartes says we must frequently consider the many vain and 
useless cares that trouble ambitious people. It may seem odd that Descartes regards ambitious 
people as using their will in the wrong way; usually, ambition is a positive trait. Ambition 
involves determination and hard work, and drives us to achieve difficult goals. But Descartes is 
not objecting to this type of ambition; rather, he has in mind ambitious people who are excessive 
in their desires. Our desires become excessive when we fail “to distinguish adequately the things 
which depend wholly on us from those which do not depend on us at all” (Passions II.144, AT 
XI: 436-7/CSM I: 379). The things that depend on us fall within the control of our free will, and 
the things that do not depend on “other causes” outside of our control (Passions II.145, AT XI: 
437/CSM I: 379-80). Ambitious people—in Descartes’s sense—fail to make this distinction, and 
thus value things that do not depend on their free will, such as intelligence, beauty, and wealth 
(Passions III.158, AT XI: 449/CSM I: 386). In this way, they have unjustified self-esteem, and 
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are vain (Passions III.157, AT XI: 448-9/CSM I: 385). These vain and useless cares make 
ambitious people “slaves to their desires,” and because they cannot fulfill their desires, “they 
have souls which are constantly agitated by hatred, envy, jealousy, or anger” (Passions III.158, 
AT XI: 449/CSM I: 386).19 In short, the ultimate disadvantage of having excessive ambition is 
unhappiness.  
Recall that [B] was unclear about the advantages we should consider. It merely states that we 
must consider “the many advantages which proceed from a firm resolution to make good use of 
it [free will].” But now that we have a better sense of the sorts of disadvantages Descartes wants 
us to consider, we are in a position to clarify the advantages he has in mind. I propose that 
Descartes wants us to reflect on the advantages enjoyed by people who do value things that 
depend on their free will. That is, we should reflect on the behavior of people with justified self-
esteem. As one might expect, these virtuous people are not vulnerable to the emotional disorders 
that afflict ambitious people, enjoying a range of advantages. Most notably, because their desires 
are in conformity with their finite power, they can fulfill their well-formed desires and achieve 
happiness (Passions II.144, AT XI: 436-7/CSM I: 379). 
A practical reading of the consequential meditation on the will can also explain how this part 
of the method helps induce generosity. In section 3, we will fully consider the complexities of 
generosity by examining its “two components.” In the present context, however, I suggest that 
we think about generosity, as Descartes often does, in terms of self-esteem, or more specifically, 
maximal and justified self-esteem.20 Recall that generosity makes a person’s self-esteem “as 
                                               
19 See also Passions III.164, AT XI: 456/CSM I: 389, in which Descartes describes the problems 
that plague “weak and abject spirits.” 
20 At first glance one might think there is an inconsistency between Descartes’s claim that 
generosity is a species of esteem, and his claim that generosity causes self-esteem. I will not deal 
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great as it may legitimately be” (Passions III.153, AT XI: 445-6/CSM I: 384). The legitimacy of 
the generous person’s self-esteem is significant, because it distinguishes her generosity from 
vanity: “vanity and generosity consist simply in the good opinion we have of ourselves—the 
only difference being that this opinion is unjustified in the one case and justified in the other” 
(Passions III.160, AT XI: 451/CSM I: 386-7). According to Descartes, vanity and generosity are 
similar because they are produced by the same movement of spirits involved in the passions of 
wonder, joy, and self-love. But what makes the self-esteem of the generous person justified, 
while the self-esteem of the vain person unjustified, are the different causes of these movements. 
Vain people lack proper self-knowledge, and are thus “the most liable to become prouder or 
humbler than they ought…they are surprised by anything new that comes their way, and so 
attribute it to themselves and wonder at themselves, and have either esteem or contempt for 
themselves depending on whether they judge the novelty to be to their advantage or not” (Ibid.). 
Generous people, on the other hand, “are well acquainted [connaissent] with the causes of their 
self-esteem,” namely, “the power to make use of our free will, which causes us to value 
ourselves, and the infirmities of the subject who has this power, which causes us not to esteem 
ourselves too highly” (Ibid.). On the proposed reading, we can see how the consequential 
meditation on the will puts us in contact with these causes or reasons for maximal and justified 
self-esteem. By observing the advantages enjoyed by people with proper self-esteem, we come to 
appreciate the great power our free will affords us, and by observing the disadvantages that 
                                               
with this issue here, but as far as I can tell there is no problem with having generosity qua 
passion of esteem cause another kind of esteem (e.g. self-esteem).      
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plague people with improper self-esteem, we come to terms with our own weaknesses and 
potential for vice.21  
We are now in a position to see why the Fourth Meditation cannot involve the consequential 
meditation on the will. Many (if not all) of the advantages and disadvantages considered in the 
consequential meditation on the will pertain to the consequences of practical conduct. However, 
such considerations simply do not figure into the Fourth Meditation. Indeed, Descartes stresses 
that the Fourth Meditation dealt only “with the mistakes we commit in distinguishing between 
the true and the false and not those that occur in our pursuit of good and evil” (Replies IV, AT 
VII: 248/CSM II: 172), and that “there is no discussion of matters pertaining to faith or the 
conduct of life [vitam agendam], but simply of speculative truths which are known solely by 
means of the natural light” (Synopsis, AT VII: 15/CSM II: 11).22  
That these considerations do not occur in the Fourth Meditation is sufficient for showing that 
the Fourth Meditation does not exemplify the consequential meditation on the will. But it is 
important to see that the Fourth Meditation cannot exemplify the consequential meditation on the 
will. The consequential meditation on the will demands reflection on the actions of others, and 
                                               
21 Reflection on the behavior of other people is crucial to the process of acquiring generosity, and 
it is emphasized again in Descartes’s account of why humility accompanies generosity: “We 
have humility as a virtue when, as a result of reflecting on the infirmity of our nature and on the 
wrongs we may previously have done, or are capable of doing (wrongs which are no less serious 
than those which others may do), we do not prefer ourselves to anyone else and we think that 
since others have free will just as much as we do, they may use it just as well as we use ours” 
(Passions III.155, AT XI: 447/CSM I: 385). 
22 Earlier (footnote 15), I conceded that the meditator considers various moral propositions in the 
Fourth Meditation. This seems to conflict with Descartes’s claim that the Fourth Meditation does 
not discuss the conduct of life. Two responses are available here. First, even if Descartes is 
overstating his case in the Synopsis, it still holds that the consequential meditation on the will 
does not occur in the Fourth Meditation. Second, the moral propositions considered seem mostly 
meta-ethical in nature, as they concern the nature of the good, evil, and so on. In that sense, they 
are relevantly speculative, and thus do not immediately pertain to practical action in the conduct 
of life (arguably, a matter of first-order ethics).  
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how the consequences of their actions affect their lives. This is not a matter of speculative truth: 
we do not have innate ideas about practical conduct. We must observe, a posteriori, other people 
to learn about them. The problem that this detail poses for Shapiro’s reading is that by the Fourth 
Meditation, the meditator cannot know that other (finite) minds, let alone mind-body composites, 
exist. The cogito argument of the Second Meditation only entails that one res cogitans exists. 
And although the meditator learns about the existence of God (an infinite mind) in the Third 
Meditation, she understands that she has enough formal reality such that she could be causally 
responsible for her ideas of other things: “As far as concerns the ideas which represent other 
men, or animals, or angels, I have no difficulty in understanding that they could be put together 
from the ideas I have of myself, of corporeal things and of God, even if the world contained no 
men besides me, no animals and no angels” (AT VII: 43/CSM II: 29). From the perspective of 
the Fourth Meditation, then, the universe consists of only two substances: the meditator (qua res 
cogitans) and God. It is not until the Sixth Meditation that the meditator is in a position to prove 
the existence of extension, and that her sensory perceptions of external things are reliable. In 
short, by the Fourth Meditation, the meditator cannot reflect on the actions of mind-body 
composites; consequently, the Fourth Meditation cannot exemplify the method for acquiring 
generosity.  
 
3 Generosity in the Meditations?   
 
That the Fourth Meditation does not exemplify Descartes’s method for acquiring generosity tells 
against Shapiro’s reading. But given that the method is merely a sufficient condition for 
acquiring generosity, strictly speaking, the Fourth Meditation could still induce generosity. The 
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tenability of Shapiro’s reading, then, rests on whether the meditator does in fact acquire 
generosity.  
 Shapiro claims that the meditator is generous in two respects. First, the meditator satisfies the 
two components of generosity listed in Passions III.153. It is important to note that these two 
components initially constitute the passion of generosity, but upon becoming a habit in the soul 
they constitute the disposition or virtue of generosity (Passions II.54, AT XI: 373-4/CSM I: 350; 
Passions III.160-1, AT XI: 451-54/CSM I: 386-8). Shapiro’s original reading (2005) only 
claimed that the meditator acquires the passion of generosity. However, her more recent account 
(2008a) claims that the meditator acquires the virtue of generosity as well. This is because 
Shapiro now wants to say that virtue—not just the passions—contributes to metaphysics.  
 Second, the generosity of the meditator is not a dormant or idle disposition. If that were the 
case, then generosity would be an irrelevant feature of the Meditations, and could not ground the 
organic reading. Instead, Shapiro (2008a, 459-61) claims that generosity has an active role in the 
meditator’s progress in metaphysics. The meditator exemplifies generosity because she practices 
generosity within the context of metaphysics. In what follows, I argue against both of these 
claims: the meditator cannot acquire either component of generosity (sections 3.1-3.2) and, by 
extension, generosity cannot be practiced in the Meditations (section 3.3). 
 
3.1   The First Component 
  
Descartes describes the first component of generosity as follows: “the first consists in his 
knowing [connaît] that nothing truly belongs to him [qu’il n’y a rien qui véritablement lui 
appartienne] but this freedom to dispose his volitions, and that he ought to be praised or blamed 
for no other reason than his using this freedom well or badly” (Passions III.153, AT XI: 445-
6/CSM I: 384). According to Shapiro, the first component amounts to “the recognition on each 
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of our parts that we have a free will” (2005, 28). In an earlier paper, Shapiro characterizes this 
recognition as follows: 
The first step in acquiring generosity is to recognize that we are freely willing, and I have 
been suggesting that this recognition comes principally with a critical reflection on what 
we find ourselves taking for granted. For it is precisely with this reflection, which 
essentially involves turning our thoughts away from those to which we are predisposed, 
that we exercise our freedom. The primordial exercise of our free will occurs when we do 
something other than what our senses dispose us to do. Doing this involves taking a risk, 
but this risk is also accompanied by a feeling toward one’s own power in that 
undertaking. It is this feeling that constitutes our experience of our free will, and so it is 
this feeling that completes our understanding that we have a free will. (1999, 257-8) 
  
On this reading, the meditator surely acquires the first component in the Fourth Meditation (AT 
VII: 57-8/CSM II: 40). But it is not clear that merely knowing that “we have a free will” amounts 
to the first component of generosity. Descartes tells us that the first component involves two 
items of knowledge: first, the knowledge that nothing truly belongs to us but our free will; and 
second, the knowledge that we should only be praised or blamed for how we use our free will. 
For simplicity, I will treat the first component of generosity as consisting solely in the knowledge 
that nothing truly belongs to us but our free will (or that the only thing that truly belongs to us is 
our free will).23  
In knowing that nothing truly belongs to her but her free will, I take it that the generous 
person is doing something quite stronger than acknowledging that she has a free will (see also 
Brown, 2006, 25; Boehm 2014, 718-9). Instead, the generous person is identifying with her free 
will. She understands her-self, in some sense, as a willing thing: a res volans as opposed to a res 
cogitans. But in what sense? On a literal reading of the key phrase here, “nothing truly belongs,” 
Descartes is making a strict metaphysical claim about our essence. Boehm reads Descartes in this 
                                               
23 I use ‘will,’ ’free will,’ ‘freedom of will’, and ‘freedom’ interchangeably.  
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way: “by Cartesian standards, knowing the only property truly belonging to us amounts to 
knowing our essence,” thus,  
If I come to experience générosité—know that nothing truly belongs to me but my 
freedom—I come to know what essentially I am. Using strong terms such as ‘know’ 
(connaît) and ‘truly’ (véritablement), the definition of générosité defines not merely what 
générosité is but what we are. (2014, 718-19)24  
Call this the essentialist reading of “nothing truly belongs.” More specifically:  
[essentialist reading]: property φ is the only property truly belonging to subject S        
if and only if φ alone constitutes the essence of S.25 
  
On this approach, then, the first component of generosity consists in the knowledge that free will 
alone constitutes our metaphysical essence. According to Boehm, the meditator acquires this 
knowledge in undergoing the cogito: “the knowledge that we are free achieved through radical 
doubt—knowledge that is ‘transparent and clear as anything can be’—just is knowledge of 
ourselves. By making us aware as generous subjects, radical doubt demonstrates that we exist” 
(Ibid.). 
I do not think that a literal reading of “nothing truly belongs” is the right reading. I will argue 
that the broader context of Passions III suggests something wholly different: Descartes is using 
“nothing truly belongs” in an evaluative sense. But before offering my alternative reading, I will 
argue that that even if the essentialist reading is correct, the meditator cannot acquire the first 
component of generosity in the Second Meditation, as Boehm claims. 
By Cartesian standards, to have knowledge of an essence, we must have a clear and distinct 
perception or idea of it. Here, I will not discuss how we can achieve a clear perception of an 
essence. Instead, I want to focus on how we can achieve a distinct perception of an essence, a 
                                               
24 Boehm is in part inspired by Ernst Cassirer’s reading of the centrality of freedom for Descartes 
(1995, 93). See Boehm (2014, 720) for a translation of the relevant Cassirer. 
25 As Boehm puts it, “If property φ is the only property truly belonging to S, it is also the only 
property belonging to its nature or essence” (2014, 718). 
26 
perception “so sharply separated from all other perceptions that it contains within itself only 
what is clear” (Principles I.45, AT VIIIA: 22/CSM I: 207-8). Descartes proposes the method of 
exclusion for making the idea of an essence distinct (Principles I.60, AT VIIIA: 28-9 CSM I: 
213; Fourth Replies, AT VII: 223/CSM II: 157). Roughly put, the method of exclusion has us 
consider two ideas together, and try to exclude, separate, or deny the one from the other. For 
example, we must conceive of something having property T (say, thought) without some other 
property E (say, extension). If one can perform a mutual exclusion, that is, show that the 
judgments ‘Ta & ~Ea’ and ‘Ea & ~Ta’ are both true, it follows that thought and extension are 
really distinct (Murdoch 1993, 39-42).26 If one of these judgments is false, then thought and 
extension are either modally distinct or conceptually distinct (Principles I.61-2, AT VIIIA: 29-
30/CSM I: 213-5).27 
Suppose, then, that free will alone constitutes our metaphysical essence, and that in 
undergoing the cogito, the meditator becomes aware of that essence. The problem for Boehm is 
that while this awareness may be clear, it cannot be distinct; thus it cannot amount to knowledge 
(a necessary feature of the first component). This is because in the Second Meditation, the 
meditator is unclear about the metaphysical status of bodies: “may it not perhaps be the case that 
these very things which I am supposing to be nothing [i.e. bodies], because they are unknown to 
me, are in reality identical with the ‘I’ of which I am aware? I do not know, and for the moment I 
shall not argue the point…” (AT VII: 27/CSM II: 18). The meditator expresses this concern 
again in the Fourth Meditation: “I happen to be in doubt as to whether the thinking nature which 
                                               
26 For a more detailed discussion of the method of exclusion and Descartes’s broader theory of 
distinction see Wells (1966); Murdoch (1993); Nolan (1997); Hoffman (2002).  
27 Of course, thought and extension are really distinct for Descartes. But if one were considering 
(say) the property of extension, E, and the property of motion, M, then the judgment ‘Ma & ~Ea’ 
would turn out false. Consequently, they are either modally or conceptually distinct.  
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is in me, or rather which I am, is distinct from this corporeal nature or identical with it” (AT VII: 
59/CSM II: 41). Given her current epistemic position, the meditator cannot exclude extension 
from her nature. Even if free will, W, constitutes her essence, the meditator, m, does not yet 
know what to make of the judgment ‘Wm & ~Em’. For all she knows, the judgment ‘Wm & Em’ 
may be true. It is not until the Sixth Meditation that she is in a position to disprove her long-
standing sensory impression that her body is her “whole self” (AT VII: 74/CSM II: 52).  
Let me clarify the scope of my objection. First, my objection does not show that an 
experience of freedom is not foundational to the cogito. Rather, it proves that even if the 
meditator were to have the experience Boehm describes, she still would not satisfy the first 
component of generosity. Second, my objection does not show that the essentialist reading as 
such is problematic. Even if Boehm’s ascription of the first component to the meditator is 
mistaken, his essentialist reading may still be correct.  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to further discuss Boehm’s reading of the cogito. 
However, I do want to resist the essentialist reading. The essentialist reading generates a 
significant conflict within Descartes’s metaphysics of the self (and mental substance). In the 
Sixth Meditation, Descartes is explicit about the metaphysical nature of the self: “my essence 
consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thing [res cogitans]” (AT VII: 78/CSM II: 54).28 
The “I” qua res cogitans has various faculties, including the will, intellect, sensation, and 
imagination. Now Descartes does claim that some of these faculties are not essential to the mind. 
The mind has sensation and imagination in virtue of being united with a body. Thus they are 
                                               
28 Some commentators have argued that insofar as we are mind-body composites, there is a sense 
in which our self has a corporeal dimension (Brown, 2014). Though I am assuming a strict 
immaterial reading of the Cartesian self, the objection raised below does not hinge on this 
difference. 
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accidental mental faculties: “I can clearly and distinctly understand myself as a whole without 
these faculties” (Ibid.). However, Descartes repeatedly stresses that both the intellect and the will 
are essential to the mind (Sixth Meditation, AT VII: 72-3/CSM II: 50-1; Principles I.32, AT 
VIIIA: 17/CSM I: 204).29 
 Boehm acknowledges this tension between the Meditations and the Passions: “one is not 
essentially free in virtue of being essentially (intellectually interpreted) thinking” (2014, 719). 
Boehm says he “will not speculate here about whether, or how, Descartes’ position changed in 
his later writings,” but nonetheless attempts to ease the tension as follows:  
While all ideas, including those implemented by an omnipotent God or a supremely 
powerful evil deceiver, are our thoughts (metaphysically depending on our mind), they 
are separable from us in the sense that they do not depend on us exclusively; they are 
conditioned by a cause outside us. There is, however, one type of thoughts that are 
inseparable from us in any sense of that term, namely judgement…Because Descartes is 
in search of the one thing absolutely inseparable from us (the sixth Meditation uses nihil 
plane), it would not be inappropriate for him ultimately to conclude, as he does when 
defining générosité, that this is freedom and hence judgement alone. (Ibid.) 
This sort of response is problematic. It appeals to an ambiguity in the term ‘inseperable’ (and its 
corollary ‘seperable’). Boehm is using ‘inseperable’ in a causal sense. For Boehm, (free) 
judgment or volition is inseparable from the mind because it is not conditioned by external 
causes.30 However, in determining the essence of the mind, Descartes first and foremost uses 
‘inseperable’ in a conceptual sense. This figures into one application of the method of exclusion: 
If I cannot clearly and distinctly perceive P while denying Q, then Q is inseparable from P. 
Though particular thoughts (e.g. a thought about an angel) may be separable from the mind in 
Boehm’s sense, Descartes would not say that the faculty of the intellect is separable from the 
                                               
29 That the will is metaphysically essential to the mind is perhaps less well-known. See Mihali 
(2011) for a developed account of this view. 
30 Still, there remains a sense in which even judgment is necessarily dependent on things external 
to the will, because there must be some intellectual or sensory content about which we are 
judging. 
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mind in the conceptual sense. Rather, they are mutually inclusive: we cannot conceive of mental 
substance without intellection, and conversely, we cannot conceive of intellection without mental 
substance. Consequently they are inseparable in reality (Principles I.63, AT VIIIA: 30-1/CSM I: 
215; Sixth Meditation, AT VII: 78/CSM II: 54).31 In short, the essentialist reading does take on a 
significant explanatory burden. 
 But we need not pin Descartes with the essentialist reading. The articles surrounding 
Passions III.153 offer us a different way of thinking about, and distinguishing or identifying the 
self. Consider Passions III.152, the article immediately preceding Descartes’s definition of 
generosity,  
I see only one thing in us which could give us good reason for esteeming ourselves, 
namely, the exercise of our free will and the control we have over our volitions. For we 
can reasonably be praised or blamed only for actions that depend upon this free will. 
(AT XI: 445/CSM I: 384) 
 
The starting point for this alternative reading is the nature of legitimate praise and blame. If I am 
to be legitimately praised or blamed for something, whether it be one of my actions or features, 
then I must be responsible for its existence. I am responsible, in the right way, for an action or 
feature if my free volitions produced it. If an action or feature does not (or could not) be causally 
traced back to my will, then I cannot be legitimately praised or blamed for it. For example, I can 
be praised or blamed for pursuing philosophy, because this action depends on my will; but I 
cannot be praised or blamed for naturally having brown hair, because this feature does not 
depend on my will. Legitimate self-esteem, then, is parasitic on legitimate praise and blame. I 
should have legitimate self-esteem for those actions and features for which I can be legitimately 
                                               
31 There is a debate in the literature about whether a conceptual distinction between P and Q 
implies that P and Q are identical or merely co-instantiated (Nolan 1997; Nelson, 1997; Hoffman 
2002). I am not taking a stance on this issue here, but my overall reading of generosity suggests a 
robust distinction between the intellect and the will.  
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praised. Likewise, my self-esteem should not be affected by actions and features for which I 
cannot be legitimately blamed. But we must be clear about the object of self-esteem. Suppose 
that my pursuing philosophy is praiseworthy. Though this pursuit is praiseworthy and can induce 
legitimate self-esteem, it is so merely in a derivative sense. Strictly speaking, I should not have 
self-esteem for pursuing philosophy per se; rather, I should have self-esteem because I am 
exercising my will in a virtuous manner in pursuing philosophy. In short, it is the “virtuous will” 
alone that is non-derivatively or intrinsically worthy of self-esteem (Passions III. 154, AT XI: 
447/CSM I: 384). 
With this broader context in place, I think Descartes’s claim that nothing truly belongs to us 
but our freedom is best read as an evaluative, not metaphysical, claim. Call this the evaluative 
reading of “nothing truly belongs.” More specifically:   
[evaluative reading]: property φ is the only property truly belonging to subject S  
if and only if φ alone is worthy of esteem by S. 
 
On this approach, the first component of generosity consists in the knowledge that the only thing 
for which we should have self-esteem for is our freedom of will. My freedom of will is the only 
thing that truly belongs to me because it is the only thing for which I can have (legitimate) self-
esteem. The other aspects of my nature do not truly belong to me, because I (i.e. my free will) 
cannot legitimately be held accountable for them.  
 A significant upshot of this reading, then, is that it does not generate a conflict between the 
Meditations and the Passions. While the evaluative reading presupposes certain metaphysical 
claims (e.g. that free will is essential to our nature), it does not require the stronger claim that the 
will is the only property that is essential to our nature. The intellect, will, and even the body can 
31 
remain essential to the self. Metaphysically speaking, we are res cogitantes. Morally speaking, 
we are res volantes.32 
 The question now is whether the meditator can acquire the first component on the evaluative 
reading. Alas, I think that such an approach will suffer from difficulties similar to those faced by 
the essentialist reading. In order to know that we should exclusively have self-esteem for some 
aspect of our nature (in this case, free will), we must have a complete understanding of our 
metaphysical nature. It would be premature to have self-esteem exclusively for one aspect of our 
nature prior to having understood the rest of our nature. There may be some other aspect of who 
we are—of which we are currently ignorant—that we should have self-esteem for as well. The 
problem is that in the Second and Fourth Meditation, the meditator cannot know that free will 
alone should be the source of her self-esteem, because she has yet to understand her complete 
nature. In particular, the meditator still does not know whether she is identical with her body. If it 
turns out that she is identical with her body, then whatever she esteems about herself, it will be 
something corporeal. But the status of bodies is not an open question for the generous person. In 
identifying herself with her free will alone, the generous person knows she is not including 
anything corporeal. Indeed, she is doing the opposite, for she is aligning herself with God: “it 
[free will] renders us in a certain way like God by making us masters of ourselves, provided we 
do not lose the rights it gives us through timidity” (Passions III.152, AT XI: 445/CSM I: 384). 




                                               
32 Brown arrives at a similar conclusion: “The meditator comes face to face with herself as a res 
cogitans, an essentially thinking thing, the sage, the res volans” (2006, 25). 
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3.2   The Second Component 
The second component of generosity “consists in his feeling within himself a firm and constant 
resolution to use it well—that is, never to lack the will to undertake and carry out whatever he 
judges to be best” (Passions III.153, AT XI: 445-6/CSM I: 384). To determine whether the 
meditator acquires the second component, we must turn to Descartes’s distinction between the 
contemplation of truth and the conduct of life. I will argue that the kind of resolution Descartes 
describes is restricted to the conduct of life, and cannot be identified with the meditator’s 
resolution to adhere to the method for avoiding error, as Shapiro claims.  
Roughly, the contemplation of truth [contemplationem veritatis] concerns fundamental 
metaphysics whereas the conduct of life [usum vitae] concerns practical action. The distinction is 
made frequently in the Objections and Replies. For example:  
I should like you to remember here that, in matters which may be embraced by the will, I 
made a very careful distinction between the conduct of life and the contemplation of the 
truth. As far as the conduct of life is concerned, I am very far from thinking that we 
should assent only to what is clearly perceived. On the contrary, I do not think that we 
should always wait even for probable truths; from time to time we will have to choose 
one of many alternatives about which we have no knowledge, and once we have made 
our choice, so long as no reasons against it can be produced, we must stick to it as firmly 
as if it had been chosen for transparently clear reasons…But when we are dealing solely 
with the contemplation of the truth, surely no one has ever denied that we should refrain 
from giving assent to matters which we do not perceive with sufficient distinctness. Now 
in my Meditations I was dealing solely with the contemplation of the truth; the whole 
enterprise shows this to be the case, as well as my express declaration at the end of the 
First Meditation where I said that I could not possibly go too far in my distrustful 
attitude, since the task in hand involved not action but merely the acquisition of 
knowledge. (Replies II, AT VII: 149/CSM II: 106)33 
 
Descartes is claiming that the epistemic norms that govern theoretical judgments in the 
contemplation of truth should not be extended to practical judgments in the conduct of life. In the 
contemplation of truth, the goal is to acquire knowledge of the true nature of things. To do so, we 
                                               
33 See also Replies IV, AT VII: 248/CSM II: 172; Replies V, AT VII: 351/CSM II: 243. 
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must ensure that our theoretical judgments are always grounded in clear and distinct perception. 
But acquiring clear and distinct perceptions takes a lot of time; indeed, it can take weeks to 
complete a meditation (Replies II, AT VII: 130/CSM II: 94). Thus, in the conduct of life, where 
we have a limited window of opportunity to judge and act, we should not try to ground our 
practical judgments in clear and distinct perceptions.34 Instead, we should make the best 
practical judgments we can, so that the opportunity to act does not pass us by.35 Significantly, 
our best practical judgments can only achieve “moral certainty,” that is,  
[C]ertainty which is sufficient to regulate our behaviour, or which measures up to 
certainty we have on matters relating to the conduct of life which we never doubt, though 
we know that it is possible, absolutely speaking, that they may be false. (Principles 
IV.205, AT VIIIA: 327/CSM I: 289, fn. 2) 
 
In order to “judge well” (i.e. make morally certain practical judgments) we must have 
“knowledge of the truth” and “practice in remembering and assenting to this knowledge 
whenever the occasion demands” (Letter to Elizabeth 15 September 1645, AT IV: 291/CSMK: 
265). Here, “knowledge of the truth” refers to four primary truths of metaphysics and natural 
philosophy (AT IV: 291-3/CSMK: 265-6).36 Roughly, we must know, 
(1) The goodness of God, which teaches us to accept both the good and the bad things 
that happen to us.  
 
(2) The immortality of the soul, which teaches us that the mind is more noble than the 
body, that we should not fear death, and that we should detach our affections from 
this world.  
 
(3) The immensity of the universe, which teaches us to not think that the earth is only 
made for man, and that we belong to God’s council. 
                                               
34 See Principles I.3, AT VIIIA: 5/CSM I: 193; Letter to Hyperaspistes August 1641, AT III: 
422-3/CSMK: 188-9; Letter to Elizabeth May 1646, AT IV: 414-5/CSMK: 288. 
35 See Letter to Reneri for Pollot April or May 1638, AT III: 34-5/CSMK: 96-7; Letter to 
Elizabeth 6 October 1645, AT IV: 307/CSMK: 269; Discourse III, AT VI: 25/CSM I: 123. 
36 These four truths are primary because they “concern all our actions in general” (AT IV: 294-
5/CSMK: 267).  However, “many others must be known which concern more particularly each 
individual action” (Ibid.). 
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(4) The interconnectedness of the universe, which teaches us that the interests of our 
greater communities should be preferred over our own particular interests.  
 
According to Descartes, if we know these truths, and habituate ourselves to assent to them, we 
will acquire the disposition to judge well, and consequently to act virtuously (AT IV: 295-
6/CSMK: 267). Descartes stresses, however, that having this disposition to judge well does not 
guarantee that we will make our best practical judgments, or act in accordance with them. In 
other words, this disposition is not sufficient for virtue. We still face a key psychological barrier 
to exercising virtue, namely, irresolution. Fundamentally, irresolution is a state of indecisiveness 
with respect to some course of action (Passions III.170, AT XI: 459-460/CSM I: 390-1). 
Irresolution per se, however, is not the problem; moderate irresolution can help us make the right 
decision. Excessive irresolution, rather, is Descartes’s target. This form of irresolution is the real 
barrier to virtue, and the source of vice and regret (Letter to Elizabeth 15 September 1645, AT 
IV: 295/CSMK: 267; Letter to Queen Christina, 20 November 1647, AT V: 83-4/CSMK: 325).  
Descartes distinguishes between two stages of irresolution in the conduct of life. First, we 
can be irresolute at the stage of deliberation. This happens when we spend too much time trying 
to determine the right course of action. We might believe that if we had more time at our 
disposal, we could gather further information that would allow us to arrive at a better judgment. 
Second, we can be irresolute at the stage of action (Letter to Elizabeth May 1646, AT IV: 414-
5/CSMK: 288). This happens when we fail to act in accordance with our best judgment, because 
we fear that we may have nonetheless made the wrong judgment. Given the ways in which 
irresolution can prevent virtuous judgment and action, the virtuous person not only needs the 
disposition to judge well, but also the disposition to not be irresolute. As Shoshana Brassfield 
puts it, the virtuous person must have resolution: “a character trait constituted by a disposition 
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of the will to determine itself in accordance with a judgment in the face of uncertainty” (2013, 
167).  
With this account of the contemplation of truth and the conduct of life in place, let us now 
turn to the second component of generosity. On Shapiro’s reading, the second component 
amounts to “the resolution to use our will well” (2005, 28).37 Shapiro seems to read the second 
component as a general, all-purpose resolution. Regardless of the type of activity we are engaged 
in, we exemplify the second component of generosity if we are resolving to use our will well.38 
Thus the meditator surely exemplifies the second component, for she resolves to use her will 
well in adhering to the method for avoiding error. However, Shapiro seems to ignore Descartes’s 
clarification about the second component: “the second consists in his feeling within himself a 
firm and constant resolution to use it well—that is [c’est-à-dire], never to lack the will to 
undertake and carry out whatever he judges to be best” (Passions III.153, AT XI: 445-6/CSM I: 
384). I contend that Descartes’s complete description of the second component implies that the 
generous person’s resolution to use her will well pertains only to the conduct of life. 
Consequently, it cannot be identified with that of the meditator’s.  
Two points are noteworthy here. First, unlike the meditator, notice that the generous person 
is in the business of making practical judgments: she resolves to undertake and carry out 
whatever she judges to be best. One might object that when the meditator affirms her clear and 
distinct perceptions, she too is making her best (theoretical) judgments. This is true on a broad 
                                               
37 Given that Boehm attributes generosity to the meditator prior to the Fourth Meditation, he has 
to locate the resolution to use the will elsewhere. According to Boehm, “the undertaking of a 
programme of doubt in the first place, the use of good reasons in generating doubt and the 
stubborn insistence to persist in doubt are expressions of this resolve” (2014, fn. 33). The 
objections raised below against Shapiro’s reading will show that this is not the kind of resolution 
Descartes has in mind. 
38 This seems to be a divergence from Shapiro’s earlier view (1999, 263-9). 
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reading of “best.” However, Descartes only uses phrases such as “best judgment” and “whatever 
he judges to be best” in discussing the conduct of life; these phrases never appear in the 
Meditations or the Objections and Replies. Furthermore, the content of these judgments must be 
about some course of action. However, in adhering to the method for avoiding error, the 
meditator is not at all concerned with action. Recall, the whole project of the Meditations is in 
part premised on the condition that “the task in hand does not involve action [agendis] but 
merely the acquisition of knowledge” (First Meditation, AT VII: 22/CSM II: 15). When the 
meditator affirms the real distinction between mind and body, for example, she is not making a 
judgment about a course of action, which she must then undertake and carry out. Rather, the 
meditator is affirming a metaphysical truth, the content of which involves no plan of action. Of 
course, she must always reaffirm this truth in the future, but doing so would not amount to 
carrying out her original judgment in the relevant sense.  
Second, notice that the generous person’s resolution is defined with respect to irresolution: in 
having a firm and constant resolution never to lack the will to undertake and carry out her best 
judgments, the generous person has the disposition to not be irresolute. Recall that irresolution is 
generated by two key features of practical contexts: (i) a limited amount of time to make a 
judgment, and (ii) the inability to ground one’s judgment in a clear and distinct perception. 
However, these features are non-starters in the Meditations: the meditator is in no way pressed 
for time (Replies II, AT VII: 130/CSM II: 94), and the method for avoiding error requires her to 
refrain from affirming obscure and confused perceptions (Fourth Meditation, AT VII: 59-
60/CSM II: 41). Moreover, there is no worry about the meditator being indecisive when she has a 
clear and distinct perception, because her will is compelled to affirm it (Fourth Meditation, AT 
VII: 58-9/CSM II: 41; Replies II, AT VII: 156/CSM II: 111). There seems to be no relevant 
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sense, then, in which the meditator is disposing herself to not be irresolute in adhering to the 
method for avoiding error. Indeed, if the meditator resolved (say) to make her best metaphysical 
judgments in the face of obscure and confused perceptions, she would not be in good standing 
with respect to the method for avoiding error. This is not to say that the meditator is not, in some 
sense, resolute. However, the resolution exemplified in the meditator’s adherence to the method 
for avoiding error must be a different kind of disposition of the will. 
 
3.3   Practicing Generosity  
Given that the meditator cannot satisfy the two components of generosity, it follows that she 
cannot practice generosity. Indeed, Descartes does not describe generous actions in the way that 
Shapiro’s reading requires, as he does not suggest that metaphysical inquiry counts as an 
instance of generosity. Descartes always describes the exercise of generosity as a practical, 
other-regarding activity. As Deborah Brown puts it, “the good will [of the generous person] is 
the same thing as good will towards others” (2006, 203; see also Frierson 2002). Roughly put, 
this is because the grounds the generous person has for her self-esteem leads her to have esteem 
for others. It is not her freedom that is worthy of esteem; rather, freedom is worthy of esteem. 
Other people, then, are worthy of esteem because they also have free wills and are capable of 
“achieving the same knowledge and feeling” about themselves (Passions III.154, AT XI: 
446/CSM I: 384). Thus generous people “are naturally led to do great deeds” and “esteem 
nothing more highly than doing good to others and disregarding their own self-interest” 
(Passions II.156, AT XI: 447-8/CSM I: 385).39 
                                               
39 See also Passions III.154 AT XI: 446/CSM I: 384; Passions III.155, AT XI: 447/CSM I: 385; 
Passions III.187, AT XI: 470/CSM I: 395; Passions III.164, AT XI: 455-6/CSM I: 388-9.  
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To be sure, there may be a sense in which a theoretical activity can exemplify generosity. It 
is plausible, for example, that a philosopher can perform a great deed in writing theoretical texts 
for the benefit of others (Fennen 2012, 33-6). But this does not imply that metaphysical inquiry 
per se exemplifies generosity. Though Descartes may be generous in writing and sharing his 




We have encountered a variety of problems with reading Descartes’s ethics back into his 
metaphysics. In closing, however, I would like to emphasize a problem that has only been 
gestured at throughout our discussion. That is, by making ethics central to the foundations of 
Descartes’s system commentators run the risk of obscuring, if not losing, his ethics. Indeed, 
Descartes’s ethics starts to seem like a recapitulation of his metaphysics and epistemology.40 But 
it is not. Generosity is antithetical to the isolated cognitive exercises of the meditator: in 
acquiring generosity, we are supposed to observe others to learn about our own freedom, and in 
exercising generosity we must regard other people as worthy of esteem. As I see it, the 
interesting issues concerning the systematic relationship Descartes envisions between his 
metaphysics and ethics lie not in bridging a supposed gap between metaphysical inquiry and 
ethical practice. Rather, they concern how the meditator can emerge from her isolated 
meditations to become a generous agent committed to the well-being of others.  
 
 
                                               
40 For example, Shapiro’s stripped-down version of generosity seems to make it an intellectual or 
epistemic virtue. Epistemic virtue may be central to the Meditations (Davies 2001; Sosa 2012; 
Shapiro 2013). But Shapiro requires moral—not epistemic—virtue for the organic reading. 
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3 DESCARTES ON THE UNITY OF THE VIRTUES 
 
1 A Tension in Cartesian Ethics 
There is no standard interpretation of Cartesian ethics, as commentators are divided about 
what kind of ethics Descartes espouses. Descartes has been labeled as a virtue ethicist (Shapiro 
2008), a deontological virtue ethicist (Naaman-Zauderer 2010), and it has even been suggested 
that he is a consequentialist (Svennson 2010). However, all commentators agree that a theory of 
virtue lies at the heart of Descartes’ moral philosophy. This is because Descartes claims that our 
supreme good is found in the exercise of virtue. According to Descartes, the “supreme good is 
undoubtedly the thing we ought to set ourselves as the goal of all our actions” (AT IV: 
275/CSMK: 261), and that goal is virtue: 
I make a distinction between the supreme good—which consists in the exercise of 
virtue, or, what comes to the same, the possession of all those goods whose 
acquisition depends upon our free will—and the satisfaction of mind which results 
from that acquisition.  (AT IV: 305/CSMK: 268) 
 
Although commentators have offered extensive accounts of the Cartesian supreme good, they 
have failed to notice that Descartes is not always unequivocal about what he means by ‘virtue’, 
especially with respect to the metaphysics of virtue. Prima facie, he presents two conflicting 
metaphysical accounts throughout his ethical writings. The first is that there are a number of 
distinct virtues, such as justice, courage, generosity, humility and so on, each of which are 
distinct dispositions the moral agent must possess in order to respond virtuously to moral 
situations.1 The second is that virtue consists strictly in one virtue, that is, the disposition to 
judge well.2 On this account, to respond virtuously to a moral situation, an agent must simply 
                                               
1 See also AT XI: 153/CSM I: 384; AT XI: 161/CSM I: 387-388; AT XI: 447/CSM: I 385. 
2 See also AT IV: 265/CSMK: 258; AT IV: 277/CSMK: 262; AT XI: 442/CSM I: 382; AT IV: 
265-268/CSMK: 258.  
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strive to judge well to the best of her abilities, and be resolved in carrying out the determined 
course of action. The conflict between these two accounts is that the first is complex, virtue 
consists in many dispositions or character traits, and the second is simple, virtue consists in one 
disposition or character trait.     
What hangs on these two distinct metaphysical pictures of virtue? If we accept the first 
account, we must dismiss or at least severely attenuate Descartes’ frequent identification of 
virtue with judging well, and we ultimately end up with an account that is similar to that of 
Aristotle’s. This is at odds with Descartes’ expressed goal of providing an ethics that progresses 
beyond what the Scholastics, and even the Stoics have provided. As Descartes tells Princess 
Elizabeth: 
To entertain you, therefore, I shall simply write about the means which 
philosophy provides for acquiring that supreme felicity which common souls vainly 
expect from fortune, but which can be acquired only from ourselves. 
One of the most useful of these means, I think, is to examine what the ancients 
have written on this question, and try to advance beyond them by adding something to 
their precepts. For in this way we can make the precepts perfectly our own and 
become disposed to put them into practice. (Letter to Princess Elizabeth July 21 1645, 
AT IV: 252/CSMK: 256; emphasis added).   
 
On the other hand, if we accept the second account we must read Descartes’ discussion of 
distinct virtues as inconsequential, and thus we run the risk of distancing Descartes’ account 
from a fundamental position that virtue theorists have historically agreed upon, namely, that 
justice, courage, and so on are actually virtues, and that they play a crucial role in the good life.   
 In this chapter I attempt to reconcile these two readings. Though Descartes may be unclear at 
some points, I contend that he advances a unique version of the “unity of the virtues” thesis. I 
argue that Cartesian virtue is metaphysically simple, in that it consists only in the disposition to 
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judge well, while also maintaining that Descartes has a substantial conception of the virtues.3 I 
show that Descartes views each individual virtue as different manifestations of judging well; that 
is, justice, courage, generosity, and so on can be understood essentially as manifestations of our 
best practical judgments (and their corresponding actions) within different types of moral 
situations.4 In this sense, Descartes has a complex account of virtue; but this complexity is only 
conceptual since it arises from the different ways in which we can regard the different 
manifestations of the disposition to judge well—not from virtue being divided into distinct 
dispositions or character traits. 
 The chapter is divided up as follows. In section 2, I review the tension between Cartesian and 
Aristotelian virtue theory. In section 3, I provide some preliminary background on Descartes’ 
account of  theoretical and practical judgment. In section 4, I examine the intellectual and 
volitional requirements for virtue. In section 5, I argue that the volitional and intellectual 
requirements for Cartesian virtue imply that virtue is metaphysically simple, i.e. that there is a 
unity of the virtues. In section 6, I address the implications that the interpretation on offer has for 
understanding Descartes’ moral epistemology more generally, arguing that Descartes allows for 
the possibility of genuine moral knowledge.  
 
                                               
3 Two other commentators have acknowledged that Descartes advances a unity of the virtues 
thesis (Alanen and Svensson 2007, fn. 8; Naaman-Zauderer 2010, 179-181). Though she doesn’t 
make this explicit, Naaman-Zauderer argues that Descartes advances the unity of the virtues 
thesis. My argument here differs with her account in that (1) I explain how it differs from the 
ancient accounts Descartes is trying to distance himself from, (2) I explain why Descartes is 
entitled to a unity of the virtues thesis given his intellectual requirements for virtue, and (3) I 
explain how Descartes’ unity of the virtues thesis can be reconciled with his description of 
distinct virtues. 
4 I understand a moral situation as one that involves relevant moral features, i.e. as pertaining to 
virtue, happiness, the regulation of the passions. There are practical judgments that fall out of the 
scope of moral situation, e.g. practical judgments about one’s health and survival. 
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2  Aristotelian Virtue  
Descartes engaged many aspects of Aristotelian philosophy throughout his career, and moral 
philosophy was no exception. As the correspondence with Princess Elizabeth shows, he was 
well-aware of Aristotelian virtue theories that his contemporaries might have advocated, and 
made an effort to distinguish his account from theirs.5 Indeed, Descartes was one of many 
philosophers attempting to provide a new conception of morality. This project not only involved 
establishing a new metaphysical foundation for moral philosophy, but also providing new 
conceptions of wisdom and virtue (AT IXB: 14/CSM I: 186). In a 1645 letter to Princess 
Elizabeth, Descartes explains his problem with past theories of virtue: 
He should have a firm and constant resolution to carry out whatever reason 
recommends without being diverted by his passions or appetites. Virtue, I believe, 
consists precisely in sticking firmly to this resolution; though I do not know that 
anyone has ever so described it. Instead, they have divided it into different species 
to which they have given various names, because of the various objects to which 
it applies. (AT IV: 265/CSMK: 258) 
 
According to Descartes, the problem with past theories of virtue is that they have “divided virtue 
into different species, because of the various objects to which it applies.” That is, they have 
identified and distinguished different types of virtue, according to the different types of moral 
situations that demand moral action. Descartes is unclear about who he has in mind here, but the 
broader context of his ethical writings suggests that he has some stripe of Aristotelian virtue 
ethics in mind.  
                                               
5 It’s not clear how sophisticated Descartes’ understanding was of Aristotelian virtue theories. 
So, I think that a general formulation of the Aristotelian view will suffice to capture what 
Descartes had probably encountered. 
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 According to Aristotle, the virtues—such as courage, generosity, patience, and bravery— are 
distinct character traits that are each a mean between an excess and a deficiency, and which are 
guided by practical wisdom (phronesis): 
Virtue, then, is a state involving rational choice, consisting in a mean relative to us 
and determined by reason – the reason, that is, by reference to which the practically 
wise person would determine it. It is a mean between two vices, one of excess, the 
other of deficiency. (NE II, 1106b-1107a). 
  
For example, virtuous courage is the mean between the vice of recklessness and the vice of 
cowardice. As Richard Kraut puts it, the courageous person “judges that some dangers are worth 
facing and others not, and experiences fear to a degree that is appropriate to his circumstances” 
(2014). True courage must be also guided by phronesis, which, broadly put, contributes to the 
deliberation process of how a moral agent is supposed to meet the ends set by courage.6 That is, 
phronesis guides virtue by helping determine the particular course of action one must take in a 
moral situation. 
Although Aristotle divides virtues into different “species,” there remains a close relationship 
among the virtues. Since phronesis requires all of the virtues, and all of the virtues require 
phronesis, it follows that the possession of any single virtue implies the possession of all of the 
other virtues. As Aristotle puts it in Book IV of the Nicomachean Ethics: 
It is clear from what we have said, then, that we cannot be really good without 
practical wisdom, or practically wise without virtue of character. Moreover, on these 
lines one might also meet the dialectical argument that could be used to suggest that 
the virtues exist in isolation from one another. The same person, it might be argued, is 
not best suited by nature for all the virtues, so that he will already have acquired one 
before he has acquired another. This is possible in respect of the natural virtues, but 
not in respect of those on the basis of which a person is said to be really good; for he 
                                               
6 For a more detailed account of the relationship between phronesis and the virtues see Russell 
(2012) and Telfer (1989). 
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will possess all of them as soon as he acquires the one, practical wisdom. (NE VI, 
1144b-1145a)7 
 
Here, Aristotle espouses what is often called the “unity of the virtues” thesis. Although the 
virtues are distinct character traits, they form a unity because one cannot possess one virtue 
without possessing the rest of the virtues. Strictly speaking, however, there are different versions 
of the unity of the virtues thesis. Following T.H. Irwin and other scholars who have adopted his 
view and terminology, I will call Aristotle’s version of the unity of the virtues the “reciprocity of 
the virtues” thesis (Irwin 1988, 1995; cf. Curzer 2012). There is a “reciprocity” between the 
virtues because they are inseparable. However, there is a stronger version of the unity of the 
virtues thesis. On this stronger view, the virtues form a unity because they are all identical to 
each other. Following Brickhouse and Smith, I will call this version of the unity of the virtues the 
“identity of the virtues” thesis (1997). In what follows, I will argue that Descartes is committed 
to the identity of the virtues, because all the virtues have one and the same nature, i.e. they are all 
reducible to the disposition to judge well.  
 There is an important interpretive clarification in order. There are differences in the literature 
about Aristotle’s account of the unity of the virtues. The dominant interpretation is that he holds 
the “reciprocity of the virtues” thesis; however, there are some interpreters, such as McDowell, 
who argue that he espouses the identity of the virtues thesis. According to McDowell, virtue 
consists in a type of perceptual sensitivity to respond to a moral situation in the right way (1979, 
334). All of the virtues have the same nature, then, because they consist in knowledge. My aim 
here is not to settle this debate in the literature. It is possible that Descartes misinterpreted 
                                               
7 By ‘natural virtues’ Descartes mean character traits that one could be born with. Natural virtues 
are separable, because one could be born with the virtue of kindness (or at least an inclination 
toward kindness), yet not possess the virtue of courage. In the case of the true virtues, however, 
possession of one virtue requires the possession of all the other virtues (See NE IV, section 13). 
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Aristotle’s ethics. However, Descartes’ reading is at least one possible way to regard Aristotle’s 
account of virtue, and I am interested in how he distances himself from that view. 
I want to raise three questions to help guide our inquiry into Cartesian virtue: 
1) How does Descartes replace the variety of Aristotelian virtues with just one virtue, the 
disposition to judge well? 
 
2) Why does he still avail himself of an Aristotelian classification of virtues?  
 
3) Does Descartes succeed in providing a new conception of virtue? 
 
I propose that we find our answers in Descartes’ account of practical judgment, and how 
practical judgment is grounded in knowledge of metaphysics, epistemology, and natural 
philosophy.  
 
3 Descartes’ Theory of Judgment 
 
3.1 Theoretical Judgment 
 
Cartesian judgment, in general, is the product of the interaction of two faculties of the 
mind—the intellect and the will. When we make a judgment, we are either affirming or denying 
some proposition or idea. The proposition or content of the judgment is supplied by the intellect, 
and the volitional component—i.e. affirmation or denial—is supplied by the will. When we don’t 
affirm or deny a proposition we are effectively suspending judgment. In the Fourth Meditation, 
Descartes draws a sharp distinction between the intellect and the will in order to explain the 
source of error as well as the source of truth. According to Descartes, error is not due to a defect 
in the intellect or will; rather it is because there is a disparity between their “scopes,” that is, the 
range of perceptions they can operate on. The scope of the intellect—what enables us to perceive 
ideas—is finite in that it fails to perceive and understand a countless number of things (AT VII: 
56/CSM II: 39). The scope of the will—the ability to affirm or deny these ideas—however, has a 
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radically different range. Not only is it infinite in scope, but also perfect in that, “in the essential 
and strict sense,” it’s just like God’s will:  
It is only the will, or freedom of choice, which I experience within me to be so 
great that the idea of any greater faculty is beyond my grasp; so much so that it is 
above all in virtue of the will that I understand myself to bear in some way the 
image and likeness of God. For although God’s will is incomparably greater than 
mine, both in virtue of the knowledge and power that accompany it and make it 
more firm and efficacious, and also in virtue of its object, in that it ranges over a 
greater number of items, nevertheless it does not seem any greater than mine 
when considered as will in the essential and strict sense. (AT VII: 57/CSM II: 40) 
 
The will, then, is infinite insofar as it can affirm or deny any perception the intellect puts forth 
for its consideration; as such, there will never be a perception that the will could not operate on. 
We err when the infinite and finite capacities of the will and intellect (respectively) fail to hook 
up in the appropriate way, that is, when we affirm things we have not understood.  
But we do not always fail. So, how can these faculties coordinate to supply true and justified 
judgments, i.e. knowledge? In the analysis of knowledge in the Meditations, Descartes is first 
and foremost concerned with indefeasible or perfect knowledge, i.e. scientia.8 Broadly put, 
according to Descartes, we arrive at scientia when the contents that the intellect supplies for the 
will’s consideration are “clear and distinct.” Descartes defines clear and distinct perceptions as 
follows: 
A perception which can serve as the basis for a certain and indubitable judgement 
needs to be not merely clear but also distinct. I call a perception ‘clear’ when it is 
present and accessible to the attentive mind—just as we say that we see 
something clearly when it is present to the eye's gaze and stimulates it with a 
sufficient degree of strength and accessibility. I call a perception ‘distinct’ if, as 
well as being clear, it is so sharply separated from all other perceptions that it 
contains within itself only what is clear  
(AT VIIIA: 21-22/CSM I: 207-8). 
 
                                               
8 Later in section 6, I will argue that Descartes allows for a less perfect kind of knowledge in the 
context of moral deliberation. 
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Essentially, a clear and distinct perception is an idea or proposition that the intellect has fully 
understood as true. Descartes maintains a classical correspondence theory of truth; so, a clear and 
distinct perception is a proposition or idea that accurately corresponds to reality (AT II: 
597/CSMK: 139). As such, there is no room for error when a judgment is made about a clear and 
distinct perception. Examples of clear and distinct perceptions are: “I think, I am,” “the nature of 
body is extension,” and “God is infinitely perfect.” For Descartes, since these propositions are 
both true and clear and distinct, judgments about them will be true as well.  
Notice that I have been assuming the judgments we make about clear and distinct perceptions 
are always in the affirmative. But isn’t it possible for us to deny clear and distinct perceptions, 
e.g. negate the truth of “5+7=12”, and thus fail to achieve knowledge? In fact, Descartes rejects 
this possibility for he claims that when the intellect has fully analyzed an idea into a clear and 
distinct perception, the will is compelled to affirm it: 
 I could not but judge that something which I understood so clearly was true; but 
this was not because I was compelled so to judge by any external force, but 
because a great light in the intellect was followed by a great inclination in the 
will, and thus the spontaneity and freedom of my belief was all the greater in 
proportion to my lack of indifference. (AT VII: 58-59/CSM II: 41; emphasis 
added) 
 
The thought here is that we cannot understand a perception like “5+7=12” without 
simultaneously affirming it. On this picture, knowledge is, in a sense, automatically achieved 
when clear and distinct perceptions are acquired because the will is compelled to affirm their 
truth.9 Anything less than clear and distinct perception or confused and obscure perceptions will 
not compel the will, which prevents any judgments about them from achieving the status of 
                                               
9 According to Descartes in the Third and Fourth Meditations, to have knowledge or scientia one 
must also have understood the existence of God and that he is not a deceiver with respect to our 
clear and distinct perceptions. Mere clear and distinct perception is not sufficient for knowledge 





3.2 Practical Judgment 
 
For Descartes, theoretical judgments based on clear and distinct perceptions have absolute or 
metaphysical certainty. This kind of “certainty arises when we believe that it is wholly 
impossible that something should be otherwise than we judge it to be” (AT VIIIA: 328/CSM I: 
290). Judgments that reach this level of certainty form a class of judgments Descartes calls 
scientia, or perfect knowledge [perfecte scire]. However, clear and distinct perceptions cannot be 
acquired in every field of inquiry. Descartes thinks that clear and distinct perceptions are limited 
to “the contemplation of the truth”, that is, metaphysics, mathematics, and certain areas of 
natural philosophy (“evident reasoning about material things” (AT VIIIA: 328/CSM I: 290). 
When it comes to practical matters or the “conduct of life”, Descartes claims practical judgments 
cannot be grounded in clear and distinct perceptions. The distinction between the different 
epistemic norms that govern the contemplation of the truth and conduct of life is made frequently 
in the Objections and Replies. For example:  
I should like you to remember here that, in matters which may be embraced by the 
will, I made a very careful distinction between the conduct of life and the 
contemplation of the truth. As far as the conduct of life is concerned, I am very far 
from thinking that we should assent only to what is clearly perceived. On the 
contrary, I do not think that we should always wait even for probable truths; from 
time to time we will have to choose one of many alternatives about which we have no 
knowledge, and once we have made our choice, so long as no reasons against it can 
be produced, we must stick to it as firmly as if it had been chosen for transparently 
clear reasons…But when we are dealing solely with the contemplation of the truth, 
surely no one has ever denied that we should refrain from giving assent to matters 
which we do not perceive with sufficient distinctness. Now in my Meditations I was 
dealing solely with the contemplation of the truth; the whole enterprise shows this to 
be the case, as well as my express declaration at the end of the First Meditation where 
I said that I could not possibly go too far in my distrustful attitude, since the task in 
hand involved not action but merely the acquisition of knowledge. (Replies II, AT 




Here, Descartes leaves open the possibility that some of our practical judgments can be grounded 
in clear and distinct perceptions. But in other texts, he seems fairly clear that practical judgments 
cannot be grounded in clear and distinct perceptions and thus cannot achieve absolute certainty. 
Instead, they can only achieve moral certainty:  
[C]ertainty which is sufficient to regulate our behavior, or which measures up to 
the certainty we have on matters relating to the conduct of life which we never 
normally doubt, though we know it is possible, absolutely speaking, that they may 
be false. (AT VIIIA: 327/CSM I: 289) 
 
On this view, we cannot clearly and distinctly perceive the objects of a practical judgment, which 
entails that our judgment cannot be guaranteed to be true (they may, “absolutely speaking,” be 
false). According to the standard interpretation, moral certainty applies to all practical 
judgments. I am going to argue, however, that Descartes distinguishes between two types of 
practical judgments. On the one hand, we have occurrent practical judgments, judgments that we 
formulate in order to respond to a present moral situation. On the other hand, we have 
retrospective practical judgments, that is, judgments about our past occurrent practical 
judgments and actions. I will argue that moral certainty attends occurrent practical judgments; 
however, retrospective practical judgments can achieve a higher degree of certainty. Before 
turning to a more in depth analysis of moral certainty and practical judgment, however, we 
should return to our analysis of Cartesian virtue. 
 
4 The Intellectual and Volitional Requirements for Virtue 
Descartes identifies two necessary conditions for exercising virtue: “In order to be always 
disposed to judge well [disposé à bien juger], only two things seem to me necessary. One is 
knowledge of the truth [la conaissance de la vérité]; the other is practice in remembering and 
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assenting to this knowledge whenever the occasion demands” (AT IV: 291/CSMK: 266; cf. AT 
VIIIA: 3/CSM I: 191).  
Knowledge of the truth is essential to virtue because, 
 
[V]irtue unenlightened by the intellect is false: that is to say, the will and resolution to do 
well can carry us to evil courses, if we think them good; and in such a case the 
contentment which virtue brings is not solid. Moreover, such virtue is commonly set in 
opposition to pleasure, appetite and passion, and is accordingly very difficult to practice. 
The right use of reason, on the other hand, by giving a true knowledge of the good, 
prevents virtue from being false; by accommodating it to licit pleasures, it makes virtue 
easy to practice; and by making us recognize the condition of our nature, it sets bounds to 
our desires. (AT IV: 267/CSMK: 258) 
 
So, what is knowledge of the truth or the good?10 It is important to note a qualification Descartes 
makes about ascribing “knowledge of the truth” to human beings. Finite minds cannot have 
complete knowledge of the truth (that belongs to God). Thus, “we have to content ourselves with 
knowing the truths most useful to us [le plus à notre usage]” (AT IV: 291/CSMK: 266; emphasis 
added).11 According to Descartes, “the safest way to find out how we should live is to discover 
first what we are, what kind of world we live in, and who is the creator of the world, or the 
master of the house we live in” (Letter to Chanut, 15 June 1646; AT IV: 441/CSMK: 289). 
Descartes thinks that such knowledge of the truth consists of four primary truths:  
(1) the existence and nature of God 
(2) the nature of the mind and its distinctness from the body 
                                               
10 In passages where Descartes discusses the type of knowledge required for virtue, he frequently 
switches between the following phrases: “knowledge of the truth,” “knowledge of the good,” 
“knowledge of what is right,” and “an exact knowledge of things.” I interpret these phrases as 
being interchangeable because nothing in the surrounding texts suggests otherwise. Furthermore, 
Descartes seems to equate truth and goodness in the Fourth Meditation. 
11 Similarly, with respect to the truths related to tempering the passions, Descartes says: “I do not 
consider it necessary to have an exact knowledge of the truth on every topic, or even to have 
foreseen in detail all possible eventualities, which would doubtless be impossible. It is enough in 
general to have imagined circumstances more distressing than one’s own and be prepared to bear 
them” (Letter to Princess Elizabeth May 1646, AT IV: 411/CSMK: 287). 
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(3) the immensity of the universe 
(4) the moral and political standing one has in the universe  
The first two truths are metaphysical, the third falls under natural philosophy, and the fourth is a 
social or political truth. I will briefly address each, in turn.   
The first truth is that “there is a God on whom all things depend, whose perfections are 
infinite, whose power is immense and whose decrees are infallible.” Knowledge of God helps a 
moral agent regard every event in her life as a manifestation of the divine will. Thus, divine 
knowledge prevents an agent from being adversely affected by hardships; she will be able to 
accept her circumstances and rejoice in knowing that they are “expressly sent by God” (AT IV: 
291/CSMK: 265).12  
The second truth, broadly construed, concerns the real distinction between mind and body: 
“we must know that it [the mind] subsists apart from the body, and is much nobler than the body, 
and that it is capable of enjoying countless satisfactions not to be found in this life” (AT IV: 
292/CSMK: 265).13 The real distinction between mind and body is of course established in the 
Sixth Meditation and also treated in Principles I. However, this second truth involves more than 
just the real distinction. Descartes claims that the mind is much more noble than the body. 
Though unclear, there are two ways this might be understood. First, one might take it as 
                                               
12 Descartes also says that knowledge of divine providence helps one be resolute in the face of 
uncertainty: “we have no reason to fear what we have no knowledge of. For often the things we 
most dreaded before coming to know them turn out to be better than those we desired. Thus it is 
best in these matters to trust in divine providence, and to let oneself be guided by it” (Letter to 
Princess Elizabeth May 1646, AT IV: 415/CSMK: 288). 
13 Descartes seems to suggest here that the truth of the immortality of the soul must also be 
known, when he claims that the soul can experience countless pleasure that cannot be 
experienced in this life. Descartes is notoriously cagey about a proof for the immortality of the 
soul, thus it’s not clear what he might be committing himself to here. For an account of 
Descartes’ views on the immortality of the soul see Rozemond (2010). 
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Descartes’ Second Meditation claim that the mind is better known than the body. Second, it 
might be because the mind is indivisible, and the body is divisible (Schmaltz 2008, 68). 
Descartes also claims that this second truth helps an agent appropriately orient and prioritize her 
desires (AT IV: 286/CSMK: 264). It makes the moral agent realize that the pleasures of the soul 
are more important than the pleasures of the body. In this context, this is how Descartes justifies 
this claim by appealing to the fluctuating nature of extension: 
The main difference between the pleasures of the body and those of the mind is the 
following. The body is subject to perpetual change, and indeed its preservation and well-
being depend on change; so all the pleasures proper to it last a very short tie, since they 
arise from the acquisition of something useful to the body at the moment of reception, 
and cease as soon as it stops being useful. The pleasures of the soul, on the other hand, 
can be as immortal as the soul itself provided they are so solidly founded that neither the 
knowledge of the truth nor any false conviction can destroy them. (AT IV: 286/CSMK: 
264-5) 
 
Furthermore, recognizing this truth prevents an agent from fearing death; by detaching herself 
from the fleeting pleasures of earthly life, she can direct her efforts toward attaining eternal 
pleasures. As Descartes says, we must know that “the pleasures of the soul…can be as immortal 
as the soul itself” (CSMK: 264-265).     
The third truth concerns the immensity of the universe. Descartes claims we must possess a 
“vast idea of the extent of the universe, such as I tried to convey in the third book of my 
Principles” (AT IV: 292/CSM I: 265). Descartes tells Chanut: “I must say in confidence that 
what little knowledge of physics I have tried to acquire has been a great help to me in 
establishing sure foundations in moral philosophy” (AT IV: 441/CSMK: 289), and that “these 
truths of physics are part of the foundations of the highest and most perfect morality” (AT V: 
290-1/CSMK: 368). While it is clear that the moral agent must have some knowledge of physics, 
Descartes is unclear about what truths of physics he has in mind from Principles III (“the visible 
universe”). Nonetheless, Descartes is clear in his writings to Elizabeth that knowledge of physics 
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prevents from us adopting some problematic beliefs such as the view that “all the heavens are 
made only for the service of earth, and the earth only for man,” and that the “earth is our 
principal abode and this life our best.” Descartes thinks that ignorance of physics leads an agent 
to “be so absurdly presumptuous as to wish to belong to God’s council and assist him in the 
government of the world” (AT IV: 292/CSMK: 266). In other words, physics supplements 
metaphysics by helping us understand our metaphysical standing in the universe, or at the very 
least that we are not at the same rank as God..  
While the third truth concerns our general metaphysical standing in the cosmos, the fourth 
truth specifies our moral, political, and metaphysical standing in our society, political 
communities, and universe as a whole: 
Though each of us is a person distinct from others, whose interests are accordingly in 
some way different from those of the rest of the world, we ought still to think that none of 
us could subsist alone and that each of us is really one of the many parts of the universe, 
and more particularly a part of the earth, the state, the society and the family to which we 
belong by our domicile, our oath of allegiance and our birth. And the interests of the 
whole, of which each of us is a part, must always be preferred to those of our own 
particular person—with measure, of course, and discretion. (AT IV: 293/CSMK: 266)  
 
Essentially, the claim here is that we must recognize that we are individuals that are parts of 
larger social communities,14 and that the overall good of these larger communities should, within 
reason, be preferred to our own interests.15 If an agent neglects that she is a constituent of a 
larger social, political, and environmental unit and falls into, say, egoism, she will be unable to 
                                               
14 Strictly speaking, I am singling out the political and social dimensions of this passage (i.e. the 
state, family, and society). But notice that Descartes also says that we are a part of the earth and 
the universe, which suggests that we have certain obligations to our environment. 
15 Descartes is unclear about what is a reasonable degree of sacrifice for others. Princess 
Elizabeth presses him on this point, and he admits that he doesn’t have a sure method: “I agree 
that it is difficult to determine exactly how far reason ordains that we should devote ourselves to 
the community. However, it is not a matter on which it is necessary to be very precise; it is 
enough to satisfy one’s conscience, and in doing so one can leave a lot of room for one’s 
inclination” (AT IV: 316/CSMK: 273). 
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obtain “true friendship, fidelity, or virtue.” But “if someone considers herself a part of the 
community, he delights in doing good to everyone, and does not hesitate even to risk his life in 
the service of others when the situation demands” (AT IV: 293/CSMK: 266).16 In other words, 
this truth is claiming that we need to love one another. Regarding oneself as a part of a broader 
community in this way is the foundation of Cartesian love. Love, according to Descartes, 
consists of “the assent by which we consider ourselves henceforth as joined with what we love in 
such a manner that we imagine a whole, of which we take ourselves to be only one part and the 
thing loved to be the other” (Passions II.80 AT XI: 387/CSM I: 356). When one regards another 
thing or person as belonging to oneself, one “seeks their good as he does his own, or even more 
assiduously” (Passions II.82, AT XI: 389/CSM I: 357). 
The above four truths are the primary truths that constitute knowledge of the truth because 
they “concern all our actions in general.” However, Descartes also claims “many others must be 
known which concern more particularly each individual action” (AT IV: 294/CSMK: 267). 
Descartes does not identify all of these secondary truths, but he singles out two in particular. 
First, we must know that our passions tend to exaggerate the value of the objects they represent. 
                                               
16 Here Descartes seems to be making the metaphysical claim that human beings really are 
constituents of larger social units. Thus, one might be tempted to character this passage as 
offering another metaphysical truth on par with the first two truths, i.e. that humans are 
metaphysical parts of larger social and political units such as the family or the state. However, at 
the beginning of this passage Descartes makes a crucial qualification by saying that “we ought 
still to think that none of us could subsist alone…” In other words, Descartes is claiming that we 
ought to regard ourselves as being real parts of these larger social and political units. But that 
Descartes thinks we ought to regard ourselves in this way, does not commit him to any further 
metaphysical theses. In the Passions, Descartes reaffirms a non-metaphysical understanding of 
the part-whole relationship between an individual and a larger For example, he claims that a 
good father regards his children “as other parts of himself, and seeks their good as he does his 
own, or even more assiduously. For he imagines that he and they together from a whole of which 
he is not the better part, and so he often puts their interests before his own and is not afraid of 
sacrificing himself in order to save them” (AT XI: 389/CSM I: 357).  
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The passions “represent the goods to which they tend with greater splendor than they deserve, 
and they make us imagine pleasures to be much greater, before we possess them, than our 
subsequent experiences show them to be” (AT IV: 285/CSMK: 264). Second, when we face 
difficult moral situations for which we cannot derive a clear course of action, we must “embrace 
the opinions that seem the most probable” (AT IV: 295/CSMK: 267). I take it that Descartes 
does not fully enumerate the details of this latter truth because the probable opinions are 
contextually and culturally sensitive and will not necessarily apply to all moral agents. As 
Descartes says: “one must examine minutely all the customs of one’s place of abode to see how 
far they should be followed” (AT IV: 295/CSMK: 267).17 
Let us now turn to the second necessary condition for exercising virtue. According to 
Descartes, mere theoretical knowledge of primary and secondary truths is not sufficient for 
judging well because we must also be able to remember and assent to these truths when the 
situation demands: 
Besides knowledge of the truth, practice is also required if one is to be always disposed to 
judge well. We cannot continually pay attention to the same thing; and so, however clear 
and evident the reasons may have been that convinced us of some truth in the past, we 
can later be turned away from believing it by some false appearances unless we have so 
imprinted it on our mind by long and frequent meditation that it has become a settled 
disposition with us. In this sense the scholastics are right when they say that virtues are 
habits; for in fact our failings are rarely due to lack of theoretical knowledge of what we 
should do, but to lack of practical knowledge – that is, a lack of a firm habit of belief.  
(AT IV: 296/CSMK: 267) 
 
Theoretical knowledge of the truth cannot dispose us to judging well because we cannot (at least 
initially) sustain our attention on these truths. We can be distracted by a variety of things when 
                                               
17 In another context Descartes say that we should follow the “voice within” when knowledge of 
the truth on its own cannot help us determine the right course of action: “with regard to the 
important actions of life, when their outcome is doubtful that prudence cannot tell us what we 




thrown into moral situations, which makes us susceptible to making bad moral judgments and 
thus acting poorly. To remedy this, we must frequently meditate on these truths until they are 
“imprinted in our mind” (imprimée en notre spirit) such that we have a firm volitional resolve to 
act accordingly. This results in a practical knowledge of the truth or a “firm habit of belief.” That 
is, a stabilized knowledge of the truth which arms one with the relevant beliefs required to use 
the will well (i.e. judge well) in a variety of moral situations. As Descartes writes in the 
Passions, virtues “are habits in the soul which dispose it to have certain thoughts: though 
different from the thoughts, these habits can produce them and in turn can be produced by them” 
(AT XI: 453/CSM I: 387). 
  
5 Reconciling the Complex and Simple Account 
 Thus far, we have examined the conditions for judging well, but we still haven’t captured 
what it means to be virtuous. Recall, Cartesian virtue consists in arriving at a judgment for an 
appropriate course of action in a moral situation, and having the resolve to carry it out. However, 
there is an important and unique caveat: it is “not necessary that our reason should be free from 
error; it is sufficient if our conscience testifies that we have never lacked resolution and virtue to 
carry out whatever we have judged the best course” (AT IV: 266/CSMK: 258). This implies that 
an agent’s virtue doesn’t depend on the consequences of her moral judgments: 
There is nothing to repent of when we have done what we judged best at the time 
when we had to decide to act, even though later, thinking it over at our leisure, we 
judge that we made a mistake. There would be more ground for repentance if we 
had acted against our conscience, even though we realized afterwards that we 
have done better than we thought. For we are only responsible for our thoughts, 
and it does not belong to human nature to be omniscient, or always to judge as 
well on the spur of the moment as when there is plenty of time to deliberate. (AT 




Descartes restricts moral responsibility to the intellectual variables (reasoning, knowledge, 
control of passions) with which one arrives at a moral judgment and then acts. This ultimately 
makes the fulfillment of virtuous activity an intrinsic, not extrinsic affair. Because of the limits 
of our knowledge and power as finite beings, we can neither ascertain all the relevant features of 
a moral situation in the spur of the moment, nor fully foresee or control the consequences of our 
actions. Although Descartes maintains that knowledge of the truth will reliably guide us to 
virtuous judgments and actions, he acknowledges that even our best moral judgments can bring 
about unintended harmful consequences. This claim, of course, is justified by Descartes’ 
distinction between metaphysical and moral certainty. Metaphysical certainty, is attained only 
when we are clearly and distinctly perceiving eternal truths (e.g. the nature of God, mind, and 
body); in contrast, the objects of moral certainty are particular bodies and mind-body unions (or 
human beings), which entails that we cannot have clear and distinct perceptions about them. In 
short, so long as the moral agent’s conscience testifies that she used her intellect to the best of 
her abilities, she is virtuous.18 
I think that we now have a sufficient account of Cartesian virtue to answer our initial 
questions. Recall the first question: How does Descartes replace the variety of Aristotelian 
virtues with just one virtue, the disposition to judge well? Consider the following passage from 
the Dedicatory Letter to Elizabeth for the Principles of Philosophy: 
The pure and genuine virtues, which proceed solely from knowledge of what is 
right, all have one and the same nature and are included under the single term 
‘wisdom’.  For whoever possesses the firm and powerful resolve always to use his 
reasoning powers correctly, as far as he can, and to carry out whatever he knows 
                                               
18 It’s unclear exactly what conscience consists of for Descartes. Elsewhere, he seems to suggest 
that it is the “voice within”: “with regard to the important actions of life, when their outcome is 
so doubtful that prudence cannot tell us what we ought to do, I think it is quite right for us to 
follow the advice of ‘the voice within’” (Letter to Princess Elizabeth October or November 1646, 
AT IV: 530/CSMK: 297). 
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best, is truly wise, so far as his nature permits. And simply because of this, he will 
possess justice, courage, temperance, and all the other virtues; but they will be 
interlinked in such a way that no one virtue stands out among the others. (AT 
VIIIA: 2-3/CSM:191)19  
 
At first glance, one might think that Descartes is advancing the reciprocity of the virtues thesis 
because he says that the virtuous person will possess all of the virtues and that they will be 
interlinked in such a way that none of them stand out above the others. However, a closer look at 
the passage shows that Descartes is actually advancing the identity of the virtues thesis. All of 
the virtues are interlinked because, as Descartes says at the beginning of the passage, they “have 
one and the same nature”. What is this nature? It consists of the “firm and powerful resolve 
always to use his reasoning powers correctly, as far as he can, and to carry out whatever he 
knows best, is truly wise, so far as his nature permits.” By possessing a cultivated knowledge of 
the truth or wisdom, the moral agent will automatically have all the virtues. And because of this, 
the virtues “will be interlinked in such a way that no one virtue stands out among the others.” 
 The identity of the virtues thesis is confirmed in another key text as well. In a Letter to 
Queen Christina Descartes writes: 
It seems to me that the supreme good of all men together is the total or aggregate of all 
the goods – those of the soul as well as those of the body and of fortune – which can 
belong to any human being; but that the supreme good of each individual is quite a 
different thing, and consists only in a firm will to do well and the contentment which this 
produces. My reason for saying this is that I can discover no other good which seems so 
great or so entirely within each man’s power. For the goods of the body and of fortune do 
not depend absolutely on us; and those of the soul can all be reduced to two heads, the 
                                               
19 Some commentators have taken this to imply that Descartes’ applies his unity of the virtues 
thesis to Cartesian virtue simpliciter (Naaman-Zauderer 2010, 179-181). However, in this letter 
to Elizabeth, Descartes distinguishes three grades of virtue: apparent virtue, true virtue, and pure 
and genuine virtue (AT VIIIA: 2-3/CSM: 190-1). While it’s unclear whether Descartes thinks 
that apparent virtue is an instance of virtue, he does think that true virtue is an instance of virtue 
because it partly proceeds from knowledge of the truth. Descartes is clear that the unity of the 
virtues thesis does not apply to apparent virtue and true virtue. Because these virtues do not 
proceed solely from knowledge of the truth they are divided. Thus, we must qualify Descartes’ 
account of the unity of the virtues such that it applies only to pure and genuine virtue. 
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one being to know, and the other to will, what is good. But knowledge is often beyond 
our powers; and so there remains only our will, which is absolutely within our disposal. 
And I do not see that it is possible to dispose it better than by a firm and constant 
resolution to carry out to the letter all the things which one judges to be best, and do 
employ all the powers of one’s mind in finding out what these are. This by itself 
constitutes all the virtues; this alone really deserves praise and glory; this alone, finally, 
produces the greatest and most solid contentment in life. So I conclude that it is this 
which constitutes the supreme good. (AT V: 83/CSMK: 325). 
 
Here, Descartes distinguishes between two senses of the ‘supreme good’. There is a broad 
sense of the ‘supreme good’ which consists of all the goods attainable through the mind, 
body, and fortune. But there is a more strict sense of the ‘supreme good’, which consists of 
the “firm and constant resolution to carry out to the letter all the things which one judges to 
be best.” According to Descartes, “this by itself constitutes all the virtues.” In other words, 
Descartes is endorsing the identity of the virtues thesis, claiming that all of the virtues have 
the same nature. 
How exactly should we understand Descartes version of the identify of the virtues thesis? I 
contend that Descartes’ preference for the metaphysical simplicity of virtue is, arguably, 
somewhat expected given his general tendency towards metaphysical simplicity. To understand 
the metaphysical simplicity of virtue, it may be instructive to see how Descartes argues for 
metaphysical simplicity in other metaphysical contexts. In the context of the metaphysics of 
substance, for example, Descartes invokes the theory of conceptual distinction to demonstrate the 
simplicity of substance: 
A conceptual distinction is a distinction between a substance and some attribute of 
that substance without which the substance is unintelligible; alternatively, it is a 
distinction between two such attributes of a single substance. Such a distinction is 
recognized by our inability to form a clear and distinct idea of the substance if we 
exclude from it in the attribute in question, or, alternatively by our inability to 
perceive clearly the idea of one of the two attributes if we separate it from another. 




Consider the substance mind and the attribute of thought. According to Descartes, one cannot 
clearly and distinctly conceive of thought without the attribute of mind, and conversely, one 
cannot clearly and distinctly conceive of mind without the attribute of thought. Consequently, 
mind and thought are merely conceptually distinct and thus identical in nature.20 The attribute of 
thought, then, is just one way of regarding the substance of mind. Although Descartes never 
explicitly applies the theory of conceptual distinction to the virtues, I think we can employ the 
theory of conceptual distinction to understand Descartes’ claim that the virtues “all have one and 
the same nature” and “will be interlinked in such a way that no one virtue stands out among the 
others.” What this implies, for example, is that one cannot clearly and distinctly conceive of 
generosity without humility, and conversely, one cannot clearly and distinctly conceive of 
humility without generosity.21 And the same goes for all of the other virtues. 
  Let us turn to the second question: If Descartes maintains a simple account of virtue, why 
does he still avail himself of an Aristotelian classification of virtues? Recall the first passage we 
considered:  
Virtue, I believe, consists precisely in sticking firmly to this resolution [to judge 
well and carry out what one’s reason recommends]; though I do not know that 
anyone has ever so described it. Instead, they have divided it into different species 
to which they have given various names, because of the various objects to which 
it applies. (AT IV: 265/CSMK 258). 
 
Aristotelian virtue theorists are mistaken in developing a program of virtue in which distinct 
dispositions are cultivated for different types of moral situations, e.g. courage for battle and 
                                               
20 The reading of conceptual distinction I invoke here is drawn from Nolan (1997). For a 
dissenting view see Hoffman (2002). 
21 The unity of the virtues thesis, as presented in the Dedicatory Letter to Elizabeth for the 
Principles, seems to only extend to the “pure and genuine virtues”. According to Descartes, there 
are lesser degrees of virtue, or “apparent virtue,” which are not unified because they do not 
proceed from “an exact knowledge of things” and thus “such virtues differ from each other, they 
go by different names” (AT VIIIA: 2/CSM I: 190-1). 
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justice for politics. This complex apparatus of dispositions is unnecessary for Descartes because 
an agent’s comprehensive theoretical and practical knowledge of certain metaphysical, physical, 
and social truths prepares her to judge well in any moral situation. Thus, Descartes replaces the 
Aristotelian requirement of cultivating a distinct set of virtues with the requirement of cultivating 
a complex set of truths, and a single disposition to act according to those truths. When the 
Cartesian moral agent exhibits courage, it is not due to a distinct cultivated character trait of 
courage but rather due to good moral judgment that proceeds from knowledge of the truth. 
Nonetheless, we can conceptually distinguish between the virtues in virtue of the different 
applications of the disposition to judge well. The virtues of courage and generosity are both 
essentially reducible to the disposition to judge well; however, these virtues are manifested in 
different ways due to the different moral situations to which they are applicable. 
To be sure, how exactly can knowledge of the truth (and a resolute will) provide an agent 
with, say, courage? Recall the fourth truth: if an agent knows that she is merely a part of the 
universe, and that she must subordinate her interests to those of her community, she would not 
hesitate to risk her life in the service of others.22 Thus, if a moral agent has cultivated this truth in 
her mind, she will have the relevant beliefs necessary to determine and carry out a courageous 
course of action.      
In employing an Aristotelian classification of the virtues, then, Descartes is pouring new 
wine into old bottles. Terms like ‘courage’, ‘justice’, and ‘temperance’, don’t designate distinct 
virtues for Descartes, but rather different ways in which a moral agent can judge well. Descartes’ 
                                               
22 I use ‘knows’ here in a weak sense. As we will see below, this truth can only be morally 
certain. However, I argue that there still is a sense in which it is knowledge. 
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classification of the virtues is not metaphysical but conceptual, that is, it depends on how we can 
regard the manifestation of the disposition to judge well in moral situations in different ways. 
Let us now turn to our third question: Does Descartes succeed in providing a new conception 
of virtue? Recall, Descartes claims that (1) his theory of virtue has advanced beyond the ancients, 
specifically Aristotle, and (2) that nobody has described virtue in the way he has. With respect to 
(1) it seems safe to say that there are significant differences between Descartes and Aristotle’s 
conceptions of virtue. For starters, while Aristotle advances the reciprocity of the virtues thesis, 
Descartes endorses the unity of the virtues thesis. For Descartes, the virtues aren’t single parts of 
a larger whole; rather, they are one and the same, that is, identical to each other. Nonetheless, 
there are similarities between the two theories. Aristotle’s conception of phronesis or practical 
wisdom is similar in function to Descartes’ account of practical knowledge of the truth. Like 
Aristotle, Descartes regards this knowledge as a kind of wisdom, and clearly states that virtue 
proceeds from this wisdom: “The pure and genuine virtues, which proceed solely from 
knowledge of what is right, all have one and the same nature and are included under the single 
term ‘wisdom’.”23 For both Aristotle and Descartes, this kind of practical knowledge is what 
guides our action when we are in a moral situation, and allows us to have the right rational and 
emotional response to a moral situation. Moreover, both Aristotle and Descartes agree that once 
one acquires this knowledge one will then possess all of the virtues.24 The difference between the 
two on this score, of course, is that Aristotle regards the virtues as distinct yet inseparable 
                                               
23 For a more detailed account of Cartesian wisdom see Morgan (1994, 204-211) 
24 Strictly speaking, the secondary truths of “knowledge of the truth” discussed above involve 
knowledge particular to certain moral situations. Thus, there might be knowledge that is 
particularly relevant to exercising the virtue of kindness that is not relevant to courage. These 
particular truths might help one exercise a virtue better. But the general truths nonetheless 
prepare one to act virtuously in any moral situation. 
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dispositions, whereas Descartes regards all of the virtues as being encompassed in the single 
disposition to judge well. 
Let us now address (2), the claim that nobody has ever described virtue in the way Descartes 
has. Recall Descartes’ claim to Princess Elizabeth: 
Virtue, I believe, consists precisely in sticking firmly to this resolution [to judge 
well and carry out what one’s reason recommends]; though I do not know that 
anyone has ever so described it. Instead, they have divided it into different species 
to which they have given various names, because of the various objects to which 
it applies. (AT IV: 265/CSMK: 258).  
 
At first glance, Descartes seems to be making the claim that nobody has ever argued for the unity 
of the virtues thesis. While it’s unclear whether this is the claim he is making, it is surely false, 
for there have been other ancient philosophers, most notably Socrates, who have argued for the 
unity of the virtues thesis. On at least one prominent interpretation of Socrates, all of the virtues 
are identical to each other because they are all reducible to knowledge of good and evil (Clark 
2015; Irwin 1995, 41-44). Moreover, Socrates employs similar argumentative strategies to 
Descartes’ for reconciling the complexity of virtue with its essential simplicity (Brickhouse and 
Smith, 1997). According to Socrates, we can conceptually distinguish between the different 
virtues because of the different applications knowledge of good and evil has, and the different 
results this knowledge produces in moral situations. Nonetheless, Descartes’ account of virtue is 
still unique. While Socrates locates virtue in the intellect, i.e. knowledge of good and evil, 
Descartes locates virtue in the will, i.e. in a perfected disposition to judge well.25 Descartes 
acknowledges that knowledge of good and evil is a necessary condition for virtue, but it is not 
                                               
25 One on reading of Cartesian faculties, the intellect and the will are merely conceptually 
distinct, and thus identical. This is a possibility, and would place Descartes’ position closer to 
Socrates. See Nelson (1997). 
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virtue itself. Virtue is found in how we exercise this knowledge—vis-à-vis the will—in moral 
situations. 
 
6 Descartes’ Moral Epistemology 
 Now that we have an account of Cartesian virtue on the table, I would like to return to 
Descartes’ moral epistemology, and consider whether Descartes allows for moral knowledge. 
According to the standard interpretation, Descartes’ epistemic standards for knowledge are 
fixed and unchanging. True knowledge is scientia, and all other judgments amount to mere 
opinion (persuasio). I contend, however, that Descartes admits that we can have knowledge 
beyond the realm of metaphysics, epistemology, and mathematics. In particular, I want to argue 
that Descartes does allow for a stripe of moral knowledge. Although practical judgments are in 
part grounded in truths that can be clearly and distinctly perceived (knowledge of the truth), 
when we are morally deliberating, occurrent practical judgments generally cannot be based on 
any clearly and distinctly perceived features of the moral situation. Thus we need another way of 
explaining how practical judgments can amount to knowledge. I suggest that Descartes be 
understood as a contextualist. 
Epistemic contextualism is a complicated epistemological theory. Here, I am not concerned 
with pinning Descartes with a specific version of epistemic contextualism. Rather, I am only 
concerned with showing that Descartes can be understood as allowing for moral knowledge in a 
contextualist framework. For the contextualist, the term ‘knows’ is like the indexical ‘here’ 
(Rysiew 2016). For example, if Michael says the sentence “Carmichael is here,” the meaning of 
‘here’ depends on the context, i.e. where Michael is when he says it. Similarly, if Michael says 
“Carmichael knows that p”, this statement’s truth will depend on the context of the utterance. In 
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particular, it depends on the epistemic standards of the situation. Broadly construed, the thought 
here is that the standards for knowledge in moral deliberation are different than that of, say, 
metaphysics. While “absolutely speaking” practical judgments may turn out to be false, for all 
intents and purposes they can nonetheless amount to knowledge. 
First, it is important to note that even though practical judgments are not morally certain, 
Descartes does not think that there is no fact of the matter as to whether a practical judgment is 
right or wrong. That is, we should not mistakenly take Descartes’ account of moral certainty to 
imply that moral knowledge per se is impossible. If this were a commitment of Descartes’, then 
trying to attenuate his claims about moral certainty would be a non-starter. That Descartes 
allows, in principle, for the possibility of moral knowledge is due to his admitting God in his 
metaphysics. Though Descartes sheds much of the theological baggage in his philosophical 
conception of God, he still accepts that God is omniscient and omnipotent. According to 
Descartes, “every basis of truth and goodness depends on his omnipotence” (AT V: 224/CSMK: 
358-9) Significantly, this implies that for any moral situation that we are in, God knows what 
course of action would be most virtuous. At the very least, then, God has knowledge of whether 
our practical judgments are right or wrong.26  
With this point in mind, let us turn to Descartes’ account of moral certainty as applied to 
human beings and try to answer the following question: does Descartes’ account of moral 
certainty actually rule out the possibility of moral knowledge for human beings? In other words, 
do the practical judgments that finite moral agents make ultimately fail to achieve the certainty 
                                               
26 How does this square with Descartes’ voluntarism? Are practical judgments objectively right 
or wrong? Descartes’ voluntarism seems to imply that, all things considered, there isn’t an 
independent standard outside of God’s will that makes practical judgments right or wrong. 
Nonetheless, God provides us with moral guidelines that can help us steer our practical 
judgments in the right way so that they are virtuous. 
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required for knowledge?27  
Consider the following passage, which I believe clearly indicates the distinction suggested 
earlier between occurrent practical judgments and retrospective practical judgments: 
There is nothing to repent of when we have done what we judged best at the time 
when we had to decide to act, even though later, thinking it over at our leisure, we 
judge that we made a mistake. There would be more ground for repentance if we 
had acted against our conscience, even though we realized afterwards that we 
done better than we thought. For we are only responsible for our thoughts, and it 
does not belong to human nature to be omniscient, or always to judge as well on 
the spur of the moment as when there is plenty of time to deliberate. 
(AT IV 308; CSMK 269; emphasis added)28 
 
Here, Descartes explains that so long as we did our best when making an occurrent practical 
judgment, we are virtuous. Strictly speaking, we only have full control over our thoughts, thus, if 
we do our best at determining an appropriate course of action and are resolved in carrying it out, 
our virtue is secured. What happens in the world is out of our control, and we cannot be held 
responsible for things beyond the scope of our power. Given this characterization of moral 
responsibility, one might expect Descartes to say that we shouldn’t concern ourselves with the 
consequences of our actions, and that our actions are virtuous if and only if they were derived 
                                               
27 Part of the reason why Descartes thinks that moral judgments can only be morally certain is due 
to his metaphysics of mind and body. According to Descartes, body or extension—the substance 
of the material world—consists only of geometrical properties, such as size, shape, and motion. 
As such, Descartes’ metaphysics of extension rule out the possibility of natural moral properties. 
For Descartes, there is no goodness to be found in the extended world. Similarly, mind—the realm 
of thought—consists only of mental properties, e.g. ideas, sensations, and emotions. Like 
extension, then, there are no moral properties to be found in the mind.  These considerations imply 
that Descartes is not the type of moral philosopher that finds moral properties in the natural world 
(In Cartesian terms, this would mean the world of bodies and minds). When we make a moral 
judgment—e.g. saving burning puppies is good—strictly speaking, there are no natural moral 
properties that our moral judgments are purporting to track. Nevertheless, Descartes’ acceptance 
of God commits him to moral realism.  
28 Similarly, Descartes writes: “It is also not necessary that our reason should be free from error; 
it is sufficient if our conscience testifies that we have never lacked resolution and virtue to carry 
out whatever we have judged the best course” (Letter to Princess Elizabeth, 4 August 1645; AT 
IV: 266-7; CSMK: 258). 
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from the right judgments. So long as an agent’s “conscience” validates that she used her faculties 
to the best of her abilities, the story goes, she acted virtuously and the buck stops there. 
However, this whole account of virtue and moral responsibility is predicated on the idea that 
we are virtuous despite the fact that our action might bring out bad consequences. In other words, 
Descartes is allowing for us to determine, after the fact, whether our action was actually good or 
bad independently of considerations about whether we were virtuous or not. Even if I arrived at a 
virtuous moral judgment and acted accordingly, I can retrospectively determine that I did 
something wrong. I take the point of this passage, then, to be that in the case of occurrent 
retrospective judgments, we can only have moral certainty in our judgment because “it does not 
belong to human nature to be omniscient, or always to judge as well on the spur of the moment as 
when there is plenty of time to deliberate.” In other words, close attention to Descartes’ 
definition of moral certainty, I believe, reveals that it concerns only occurrent practical judgment. 
As Descartes says, “moral certainty is certainty which is sufficient to regulate our behavior,” that 
is, moral certainty pertains to judgments concerning actions we are about to undertake.  
 In the case of retrospective moral judgments, however, which we can arrive at after plenty of 
reflection, we actually can determine whether we did the right thing. As Descartes says, “There 
is nothing to repent of when we have done what we judged best at the time when we had to 
decide to act, even though later, thinking it over at our leisure, we judge that we made a 
mistake.” Thus, retrospective practical judgments have a higher degree of certainty than 
occurrent practical judgments. That retrospective practical judgments have more certainty than 
occurrent practical judgments is essential to Descartes’ theory of virtue, for if they had the same 
degree of moral certainty, then it’s unclear why Descartes would try to give us a story about 
repentance at all. That is, if after acting I cannot actually determine whether I did something bad 
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or wrong, then there would be no reason for me to repent, for the question of whether I actually 
did the right thing or not is a non-starter. Indeed, Descartes’ definition of the passion of 
repentance [repentir] requires that our retrospective practical judgments can achieve a higher 
degree of certainty. Consider the following passage, which distinguishes the passion of remorse 
from repentance:  
Remorse of conscience is a kind of sadness which results from our doubting that 
something we are doing, or have done, is good. It necessarily presupposes doubt. 
For if we were wholly certain that what we are doing is bad, we would refrain 
from doing it, since the will tends only towards objects that have some semblance 
of goodness. And if we were certain that what we have already done was bad, we 
would feel repentance for it, not simply remorse. 
(AT XI: 464/CSM I: 392; my emphasis) 
 
Here, Descartes claims that we can have certainty that we decided upon a wrong course of 
action, and that this certainty can cause repentance. Given the considerations raised above, and 
the fact that Descartes does not qualify his use of certainty here, I take it that Descartes is 
implying that we can actually achieve a higher degree of certainty in at least some of our 
retrospective practical judgments.2930 
For example, suppose I am presented with a situation where I need to prevent some harmful 
thing, δ, from happening. I judge that course ϕ is the best way to go about preventing δ. 
                                               
29 Though Descartes claims that our retrospective practical judgments can achieve “certainty,” 
it’s unclear whether he means a higher degree of moral certainty or absolute certainty. It seems 
unlikely that retrospective practical judgments can be grounded in clear and distinct perceptions, 
and thus it is unlikely that they can be absolutely certain. Nonetheless, Descartes seems to be 
implying that this level of certainty is nonetheless sufficient for us to have knowledge of whether 
what was done was right or wrong, and thus it is likely that he is allowing for the possibility of 
some grade of moral knowledge. 
30 In the Passions, Descartes says we need to prepare ourselves for moral situations by 
developing “firm and determinate judgments”. These judgments are the “proper weapons” of the 
soul because they will tell us how to act in response to particular features of moral situations 
(Passions I. 48 AT XI 367/CSM I: 347): Being firm and determinate, Descartes seems to suggest 




However, after acting out ϕ, I see that course ϕ not only didn’t prevent δ, but also brought about 
some additional harm σ. If presented with such a case, I believe that Descartes would say that we 
can know with certainty that we didn’t do the right thing. Nevertheless, he would say that given 
our epistemic limitations as finite moral agents, we are still virtuous so long as we did our best at 
arriving at the judgment to ϕ and acted accordingly. Indeed, we should learn from such an 
experience and refine our practical moral knowledge so as to avoid similar mistakes in the future 
(see the discussion of secondary truths in 3.2 above). Descartes’ moral epistemology, then, is 
more complicated than commentators have allowed. If I am correct that a subset of our practical 
judgments can achieve a higher status than moral certainty, then it seems that Descartes allows 
for finite human beings to achieve moral knowledge in their practical affairs.31 Though this may 
not meet the standards of scientia, it may be called cognitio.  
 
7 Conclusion 
 I have attempted to show how two seemingly conflicting strands of virtue theory in 
Descartes’ moral philosophy can be reconciled. That is, Descartes can consistently identify and 
classify various virtues while also maintaining that virtue is essentially metaphysically simple in 
that it consists only in judging well. This is not to say that the classification of virtues is a 
conceptual apparatus Descartes can do away with. One reason to think that such a classification 
is important for the Cartesian moral philosopher is its practical utility for moral education. By 
classifying the virtues, Descartes is able to contextualize the disposition to judge well and make 
specific instructive moral claims: “that act was not courageous because...” If Descartes merely 
                                               
31 For an account of moral certainty and probable knowledge that is consistent with the view 
presented here see Morris (1970). 
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provided a theoretical account of the disposition to judge well without accounting for practical 
applications of it (which is something he is definitely concerned with in the Passions), it’s not 
clear that the aspiring Cartesian moral agent would know how to pursue and exercise virtue.  
 This point leads to another crucial respect in which Descartes’ account differs from 
Aristotle’s. Descartes makes virtue accessible not only to the philosopher, but to the peasant as 
well. This is because knowledge of the truth is in principle attainable by anyone. As he explains 
in the beginning of the Discourse,  “the power of judging well and of distinguishing the true 
from the false—which is what we properly call ‘good sense’ or ‘reason’—is naturally equal in all 
men” (AT VI: 2/CSM: 111). For Descartes, as long as an agent truly employs her knowledge of 
the truth and moral reasoning to the best of her abilities, she will not only be virtuous, but also 






4 DESCARTES ON THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE PRESERVATION 
 
 
1 Scientia and Stability 
One of Descartes’ main philosophical goals is to achieve perfect knowledge or scientia. In 
The Search for Truth, Eudoxus (Descartes’ mouthpiece in the dialogue) calls for the need to 
establish “a body of knowledge which was firm and certain enough to deserve the name 
‘science’” (AT X: 513/CSM I: 408).1 In the beginning of the Meditations, Descartes says “it was 
necessary, once in the course of my life, to demolish everything completely and start again right 
from the foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and 
likely to last” (AT VII: 17/CSM II: 12). What exactly is scientia, and how is it achieved? In the 
Rules, Descartes defines scientia as “certain and evident cognition” (AT X: 362/CSM I: 10) and 
in the Second Replies he writes that “no act of awareness that can be rendered doubtful seems fit 
to be called knowledge” (AT VII: 141/CSM II: 101). Commentators generally agree that scientia 
is a property of certain judgments, and that there are two conditions that must be met for a 
judgment to become scientia.2 First, the judgment must be true. Second, the judgment must be 
absolutely or metaphysically certain.3 Descartes tells us that to meet these criteria, we must 
                                               
1 I employ the following abbreviations for editions of Descartes’s work: ‘AT’: Oeuvres de 
Descartes (cited by volume and page); ‘CSM’: The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vols I 
and II (cited by volume and page); ‘CSMK’: The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol III 
(cited by page). 
2 See Carriero (2009, 354-5), Cottingham (1986, 24-5), Newman (2016), Williams (1978, 187-
8). 
3 These two criteria are often presented in different ways. Keith De Rose, for example, offers the 
following definition of scientia: “S has scientia of p if and only if (1) S clearly and distinctly 
perceives that p is true and (2) S clearly and distinctly perceives the truth of the general principle 
that what S clearly and distinctly perceives is true” (citation). Here, it seems that truth is central 
to scientia, whereas absolute certainty seems to be left out. However, Keith De Rose’s 
explication of this definition shows that criterion (2) above is what delivers absolute certainty. In 
this paper, I will not delve into such nuances about truth and absolute certainty, focusing instead 
on the criterion of stability. 
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ground our judgments in clear and distinct perceptions (CDP’s). As the story goes, God qua non-
deceiver guarantees that our CDP’s are true and indubitable (Fourth Meditation, AT VII: 
43/CSM II: 62). Moreover, when we are in the grip of a CDP, it is impossible for us to doubt its 
truth; the will is compelled to affirm the CDP, and consequently we cannot go wrong in the 
judgment we make about it (AT VII: 41/CSM II: 59). When a judgment is grounded in a CDP in 
this way, it achieves truth and absolute certainty, and thus becomes scientia (AT VII: 43/CSM II: 
62).4  
The nature of clear and distinct perception, truth, and certainty have received considerable 
attention in the literature.5 In this paper, I am concerned with a feature of scientia that hasn’t 
received due attention by commentators. According to Descartes, scientia is also supposed to be 
stable, lasting, or enduring. As Descartes says at the outset of the First Meditation, he seeks to 
establish something “stable and likely to last” in the sciences (First Meditation, AT VII: 17/CSM 
II: 17). Similarly, in the Second Replies he writes: “the supposition which we are making here is 
of a conviction so firm that it is quite incapable of being destroyed” (AT VII: 145/CSM II: 103).  
What exactly is the property of stability? Stability is a property ascribed to a judgment over a 
stretch of time. A judgment is stable—in the relevant sense—when it is always absolutely certain 
and true. While there may be physiological or psychological factors that could cause one to lose 
                                               
4 I will be following the standard interpretation of scientia, according to which scientia can be an 
item of knowledge or intuition. Nicholas Jolley, however, does not interpret scientia in this way, 
arguing instead that “scientia is a body of knowledge as opposed, say, to a set of isolated 
intuitions” (2010, 86). Lilli Alanen seems to offer a similar interpretation, arguing that scientia 
means true science or true philosophy for Descartes (2008). While I agree that in a broad sense, 
scientia can be interpreted as a body of knowledge or as a systematic science, I think that there is 
a more specific sense in which scientia means an item of perfect knowledge. This is the sense of 
scientia that I will be assuming from hereon. 
5 See Humber (1981), Gewirth (1943), Lennon (2008), Markie (1983), and Tlumak (1982) for 
accounts of clear and distinct perception. See Wahl (1995) and Vinci (1998) for accounts of 
Cartesian truth. See Hatfield (1988), Schachter (2005) and Voss (1993) for accounts of certainty. 
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knowledge, in normal circumstances, scientia must endure in the mind of the epistemic agent. 
Perfect knowledge does not come and go.  
Now, one might think that if a judgment achieves truth and absolute certainty, then it is 
automatically stable as well; it will always be true and absolutely certain whenever it is formed 
in the mind of the epistemic agent. Stability, the thought goes, cannot be an extra condition on 
scientia, rather it is merely a feature that obtains in virtue of the aforementioned criteria. 
However, the very nature of CDPs—the alleged grounds of scientia—threatens the stability of 
scientia. Consider the following passage from the Fifth Meditation: 
Admittedly my nature is such that so long as I perceive something very clearly and 
distinctly I cannot but believe it to be true. But my nature is also such that I cannot fix 
my mental vision continually on the same thing, so as to keep perceiving it clearly; 
and often the memory of a previously made judgment may come back, when I am no 
longer attending to the arguments which led me to make it. And so other arguments 
can now occur to me which might easily undermine my opinion, as if I were unaware 
of God: and I should thus never have true and certain knowledge about anything, but 
only shifting and changeable opinions. (AT VII: 69-70/CSM II: 48) 
 
In this passage Descartes considers what I call the problem of knowledge preservation (PKP), 
that is, the challenge of making scientia stable. Put simply, the question is this: do I lose scientia 
once I lose my CDPs? Suppose I work through the geometric proof for the Pythagorean theorem, 
and I arrive at a CDP of “a2 + b2=c2”. While I have this CDP, my judgment about the theorem is 
guaranteed to be true and absolutely certain. But given the limited attention span of my finite 
mind, I cannot cognitively sustain the proof and I will thus inevitably lose the CDP. What is my 
epistemic state, then, when I no longer have the CDP? I am still capable of forming the judgment 
that “a2 + b2=c2” in the absence of the relevant CDP. I can, as Descartes suggests, make the very 




Assuming that the new judgment about the Pythagorean theorem is identical in content to the 
original judgment, it seems to follow that it is also true.6 But what about absolute certainty? 
Descartes suggests that we can raise intelligible doubts about the new judgment. Perhaps I was 
mistaken about having clearly and distinctly perceived the Pythagorean theorem, or maybe I 
have misremembered the CDP and my new judgment has been—albeit unknowingly—infected 
by some additional false content. Consequently, it seems that I don’t have scientia about the 
Pythagorean theorem, but only a “shifting and changeable” opinion. In other words, my 
knowledge is not stable. 
Two important clarificatory remarks are in order about memory and judgments. First, 
Descartes is working with a genuine conception of memory. One might object that there is no 
problem of knowledge preservation, because to remember a CDP is simply to regenerate the 
CDP once again. However, if this were the case, then Descartes would not raise doubts about the 
status of a new judgment based on a memory of a clear and distinct perception. If this memory of 
a clear and distinct perception was merely the reappearance of the clear and distinct perception, 
then it would provide truth and absolute certainty to the new judgment. But since the very 
epistemic status of the new judgment is what Descartes is questioning, this implies that there is a 
genuine distinction between a clear and distinct perception and a memory of a clear and distinct 
perception. To be precise, a memory of a clear and distinct perception is a non-clear and distinct 
representation of some content that was once clearly and distinctly perceived.7  
                                               
6 I am assuming that the new judgment is based on a mental representation of the Pythagorean 
theorem, as opposed to, say, an auditory or visual representation of the Pythagorean theorem. 
This is because it’s not clear whether judgments based off the latter types of representation will 
be identical in content. 
7 In this paper I will not delve into the details of what memory consists in for Descartes. For 
accounts of the nature of memory and Descartes’ distinction between corporeal and intellectual 
memory, see Joyce (1997) and Foti (2000). 
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Second, we must appreciate Descartes’ metaphysics of judgment. Descartes’ theory of the 
mind implies that all thoughts are conscious thoughts. Strictly speaking, then, we cannot have 
non-occurrent beliefs or judgments. All judgments are occurrent judgments. Given this, how 
should we understand the claim that we can make a judgment at t0 that is identical to a judgment 
made at t1? Strictly speaking, these judgments are distinct because they are occasioned at 
different times. However, we can say that they are identical if their intentional content is the 
same. In other words, two different judgments at t0 and t1 can be different tokens of the same 
type of content.  
PKP has not received much attention by commentators, but there are two possible solutions 
that can be reconstructed from the literature on Descartes’ epistemology. The first approach 
admits that judgments which are not grounded in CDPs can never attain the status of scientia. 
Only judgments that are grounded in CDPs can amount to scientia, because only these judgments 
are guaranteed to be true and absolutely certain. What, then, is the solution to PKP? On this 
view, to preserve our knowledge, we must become efficient at regenerating the corresponding 
CDP’s vis-à-vis “cognitive routes” (Sowaal 2011, 445). Scientia is stabilized, then, in virtue of 
one’s having the ability to regenerate CDPs in multiple ways. Call this approach the 
regeneration solution (Frankfurt 1962, Sowaal 2011, Newman and Nelson 1999).  
The second approach argues that so long as we remember having had the relevant 
corresponding CDPs, judgments that are not currently grounded in CDPs maintain the status of 
scientia. This is because God’s non-deceptive nature guarantees the infallibility of memory. On 
this view, both judgments grounded in CDPs and memories of CDPs (MCDPs) can amount to 
scientia. If we forget having completed a certain part of the Meditations, or have doubts about 
whether we really had a certain CDP, we must once again go through the process of generating 
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the CDP. But in the end, we preserve our knowledge over time via MCDPs. Call this approach 
the memory solution.8 
I think that both solutions pick up on features of Descartes’s considered view, but they 
ultimately fall short because they conflict with other commitments of Descartes’. On the one 
hand, the regeneration solution overestimates our ability to regenerate CDPs. Descartes warns us 
that trying to restore past CDPs is difficult and impractical, especially when we are engaged in 
scientific inquiry or moral deliberation. On the other hand, the memory solution relies on an 
assumption Descartes should not accept, namely, that God’s non-deceptive nature guarantees the 
infallibility of memory.  
Nonetheless, I think we can draw from both approaches to reconstruct Descartes’ real 
solution to PKP. In this paper I argue that preserving scientia is a matter of having virtuous 
habits of belief. That is, an epistemic agent can preserve an item of scientia by making it a 
virtuous habit of belief through engaging the cognitive routes described by the regeneration 
solution. Significantly, the faculty of memory plays a crucial role in the formation of these 
habits. Call this approach the dispositionalist solution. 
One of the benefits of this new reading is that we can make sense of Descartes’ references to 
memory in his discussion of scientia and the Cartesian circle. It is well-known that when charged 
with circularity in the Third Meditation, Descartes often resorts to an obscure discussion of 
memory. Broadly construed, Descartes claims that so long as we remember having clearly and 
distinctly perceived some idea, we maintain scientia of it even if we are no longer attending to 
the proofs that led us to said conclusion. Willis Doney argued that in these passages Descartes 
seeks a divine guarantee of memory (1955). This memory response to the Cartesian circle was 
                                               
8 The memory solution is drawn from Doney’s solution to the Cartesian circle (1955).  
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refuted by Frankfurt (1962), and it is now the standard view that memory type responses fail. But 
this leaves us with a problem. What are we to make of Descartes’ frequent references to memory 
in his discussion of scientia? Is he really just confused? I contend that although his remarks come 
in the context of the Cartesian circle, Descartes actually takes himself to be addressing a related 
but distinct problem, namely, PKP. On the proposed approach, then, we need not charge 
Descartes with being confused about memeory; rather, the dispositionalist solution can salvage 
his remarks about memory and incorporate it into his account of scientia.  
The paper is divided up as follows. In section 2, I offer a general overview of scientia.  In 
section 3, I review the regeneration and memory solutions to PKP, and argue that both face 
problems. In section 4, I extract the salvageable pieces of these solutions, and piece together the 
dispositionalist solution. In section 5, I argue that while memory is not divinely guaranteed to be 
infallible, it is divinely guaranteed to be reliable, and that this reliability is all we need for the 
stability of scientia vis-à-vis virtuous habits of belief. In section 6 I revisit the Cartesian circle, 
and argue that my new reading of scientia is consistent with at least one prominent interpretation 
of Descartes’ response to the Cartesian circle. 
 
2 An Overview of Scientia 
The Meditations is a project that is primarily designed to induce scientia concerning the true 
nature of things in the meditator. Consider how the Meditations begin. In the first paragraph of 
the First Meditation, Descartes reflects on the massive body of beliefs he has accrued from his 
youth, and realizes that despite his hopes to the contrary, what he took to be knowledge was not 
knowledge at all (let alone scientia): 
Some years ago I was struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as true in 
my childhood, and by the highly doubtful nature of the whole edifice that I had subsequently 
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based on them. I realized that it was necessary, once in the course of my life, to demolish 
everything completely and start again right from the foundations if I wanted to establish 
anything at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last. (First Meditation, AT VII: 
17/CSM II: 17) 
 
  Here, Descartes begins to give us clues for identifying and distinguishing scientia. Scientia—
it is suggested meets the following criteria: 
(1) Truth 
(2) Absolute certainty 
(3) Stability 
 
At this point, Descartes is unsure about whether any of his former beliefs amount to scientia, and 
perhaps more importantly whether scientia is even possible. He will thus examine his beliefs in 
the following way: 
To accomplish this, it will not be necessary for me to show that all my opinions are false, 
which is something I could perhaps never manage. Reason now leads me to think that I 
should hold back my assent from opinions which are not completely certain and indubitable 
just as carefully as I do from those which are patently false. So, for the purpose of rejecting 
all my opinions, it will be enough if I find in each of them at least some reason for doubt. 
And to do this I will not need to run through them all individually, which would be an 
endless task. Once the foundations of a building are undermined, anything built on them 
collapses of its own accord; so I will go straight for the basic principles on which all my 
former beliefs are based. (AT VII: 18/CSM II: 17) 
  
Descartes’ methodology for assessing the epistemic status of his beliefs is to focus on perhaps 
the most fundamental criterion, i.e. certainty. If any of his beliefs admit of even a shred of doubt, 
then, they do not amount to scientia. Of course, Descartes cannot examine each of his beliefs 
individually. As he admits, this is an impossible task for a finite mind. Instead, he will assess the 
“basic principles” or sources of his beliefs (AT VII: 18/CSM II: 17). If these sources are 
dubitable, then the beliefs that proceed from them must be dubitable as well; for once you 
undermine the foundation of an edifice, the entire structure is subsequently compromised as well 
(cf. Seventh Replies, AT VII: 537/CSM II: 366).  
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According to Descartes, we have two main sources for our beliefs and perceptions about our 
own selves and the external world, namely, our sensory and intellectual faculties. Here, I will not 
recite Descartes’ famous skeptical arguments concerning the reliability of sensation and 
intellection. For it is well-known that, by the end of the First Meditation, Descartes has achieved 
hyperbolic doubt: “I have no answer to these arguments, but am finally compelled to admit that 
there is not one of my former beliefs about which a doubt may not properly be raised” (AT VII: 
21/CSM I: 14-15). 
At this point, it seems that there is no way out of hyperbolic doubt. So where does this leave 
Descartes? The skeptical arguments of the First Meditation were about external things and truths. 
Descartes doubted, for example, the accuracy of his sense perception of the size of the sun and 
the truth of a geometrical theorem.9 At the beginning of the Second Meditation, however, there is 
a significant shift in the direction of hyperbolic doubt, as Descartes directs it inward, i.e. at 
himself:  
Yet apart from everything I have just listed, how do I know that there is not something which 
does not allow even the slightest occasion for doubt? Is there not a God, or whatever I may 
call him, who puts into me thoughts I am now having? But why do I think this, since I myself 
ma perhaps be the author of these thoughts? In that case am not I, at least, something? But I 
have just said that I have no senses and no body. This is the sticking point: what follows from 
this? Am I not so bound with a body and with senses that I cannot exist without them? But I 
have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no 
minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: If I convinced myself of 
something then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning 
who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, 
he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after 
considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I 
exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. (Second 
Meditation, AT VII: 24-5/CSM II: 16-17) 
 
                                               
9 Of course, a geometrical truth such as the Pythagorean theorem is, for Descartes, ultimately a 
prime example of scientia. However, in the First Meditation Descartes can cast an indirect doubt 
on the reliability of the intellect (the so called “defective nature doubt), which thus calls into 
question such truths.  
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We have finally arrived at what seems to be the first item of scientia for the meditator: self-
knowledge.10 More specifically, knowledge of the existence of a subject—an “I”—that is doing 
the doubting. Of course, the nature of that subject is a separate issue. But Descartes is clear that 
he cannot intelligibly doubt that an “I” exists while he thinks of himself. This self-knowledge is 
the one thing, at least so far, that seems to survive hyperbolic doubt.  
According to standard interpretations, a judgment—such as the cogito—meets these criteria 
when it is grounded in a CDP.11 One cannot directly doubt that one exists while thinking of one’s 
existence. As Descartes says at the end of the Fourth Meditation: 
If, I restrain my will so that it extends to what the intellect clearly and distinctly reveals, and 
no further, then it is quite impossible for me to go wrong. This is because every clear and 
distinct perception is undoubtedly something, and hence cannot come from nothing, but must 
necessarily have God for its author. Its author, I say, is God, who is supremely perfect, and 
who cannot be a deceiver on pain of contradiction; hence the perception is undoubtedly true. 
So today I have learned not only what precautions to take to avoid ever going wrong, but also 
what to do to arrive at the truth. For I shall unquestionably reach the truth, if only I give 
sufficient attention to all the things which I perfectly understand, and separate these from all 
the other cases where my apprehension is more confused and obscure. And this is just what I 
shall take good care to do from now on. (AT VII: 62/CSM II: 43). 
  
In the next section we will refine this standard view of scientia by examining two specific 




                                               
10 I say ‘seems’, because although Descartes claims that the cogito is the “first item of 
knowledge” (Third Meditation, AT VII: 35/CSM II: 24; Principles I. 7/CSM I: 195) it is a 
debated issue whether the cogito actually amounts to knowledge. 
11 Descartes does not explicitly reference having a CDP in the famous cogito passage. However, 
for an account of how an underlying CDP is at works in the cogito passage, see Carriero (2008, 
339-342). Some commentators argue that the cogito is still subject to doubt at this point in the 
Meditations. Curley argues that, strictly speaking, the cogito is subject to doubt in the Third 
Meditation because the meditator has yet to prove the existence of God and that God is not a 
deceiver (2006, 40). 
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3  The Regeneration and Memory Solutions 
For the regeneration solution, only judgments that are occurrently grounded in CDPs can 
amount to scientia. Any judgments detached from their corresponding CDPs will not amount to 
scientia. This is because, as Cottingham puts it “once our attention lapses, we can no longer be 
sure of the truth of the proposition intuited” (1986, 77). This is the view of scientia on the 
regeneration solution: 
 [scientia1]: a judgment, J, is scientia if and only if J is grounded in an occurrent CDP. 
What, then, is the solution to PKP? According to the regeneration solution, to achieve 
stability in our knowledge, we need to stabilize our CDPs. The view is not that we can somehow 
achieve an ability to cognitively sustain, at all times, our CDPs. The regeneration solution admits 
that CDPs are temporally indexed, momentary states of perception. The claim, rather, is that we 
need to stabilize our CDPs by becoming better at regenerating them. Thus, whenever we need to 
make a judgment that is a potential candidate for scientia, we can easily retrieve the 
corresponding CDP’s. 
According to the regeneration solution, we become better at regenerating a CDP, and thus 
stabilize it, when we have more “cognitive routes” to that CDP. As Alice Sowaal puts it, a 
(successful) cognitive route is a “series of considerations—the starting point, the series of 
reflections, and the terminus of the reflections, which is the clear and distinct perception” (2011, 
439). Cognitive routes are not mysterious; and should be familiar to any reader of the 
Meditations. In the Meditations, for example, the meditator takes one cognitive route to the CDP 
of God in the Third Meditation (a cosmological argument), and another cognitive route in the 
Fifth Meditation (an ontological argument). The thought is that the meditator’s CDP of God has 
become more stable over the course of the Meditations, because she has more than one way of 
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arriving at the CDP. And she will stabilize it further as she discovers other cognitive routes to the 
CDP of God. In short, on the regeneration solution, we meet the criterion of stability by training 
ourselves to regenerate CDPs in multiple ways.12  
The regeneration solution faces three main problems. First, although there is evidence for the 
view that Descartes engages multiple cognitive routes to attain CDPs, there is no direct evidence 
to suggest that this is how he intended to stabilize scientia. As such, the regeneration solution is 
speculative. Second, the regeneration solution is unclear about how many cognitive routes one 
must engage to stabilize scientia. In the case of the CDP of God, Descartes provides two 
cognitive routes, the cosmological argument and the ontological argument. But there are many 
other arguments for the existence of God. Do we only need to engage those provided in the 
Meditations, or are we required to learn other cognitive routes as well? Third, and most 
importantly, there is evidence that suggests that Descartes did not want us to stabilize scientia in 
the way suggested by the regeneration solution. Consider the following excerpt from a 1643 
letter to Princess Elizabeth: 
I believe that it is very necessary to have properly understood, once in a lifetime, 
the principles of metaphysics, since they are what gives us the knowledge of God 
and of our soul. But I think also that it would be very harmful to occupy one’s 
intellect frequently in meditating upon them, since this would impede it from 
devoting itself to the functions of the imagination and the senses. I think the best 
thing is to content oneself with keeping in one’s memory and one’s belief the 
conclusions which one has once drawn from them (retenir en sa mémoire et en sa 
créance les conclusions qu’on a une fois tirées), and then employ the rest of one’s 
                                               
12 It should be noted that there are some contents that we will clearly and distinctly perceive as 
soon as we think of them, and thus a cognitive route is unnecessary. As Descartes writes in the 
Second Replies: “now some of these perceptions are so transparently clear and at the same time 
so simple that we cannot ever think of them without believing them to be true. The fact that I 
exist so long as I am thinking, or that what is done cannot be undone, are examples of truths in 
respect of which we manifestly possess this kind of certainty. For we cannot doubt them unless 
we think of them; but we cannot think of them without at the same time believing they are true” 
(AT VII: 145-6/CSM II: 104).  
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study time to thoughts in which the intellect co-operates with the imagination and 
the senses (AT III: 695/CSMK: 228). 
 
According to Descartes, it is difficult for us to cognitively sustain CDP’s. As embodied finite 
minds, we will quickly be distracted by passions, imaginings, sensory perceptions, and even 
other intellections—as frequently seen in the case of the meditator. So, what are we to do when 
no longer in the grip of CDPs? Do we need to keep regenerating our CDP’s to sustain our 
knowledge? Descartes seems to addresses this question directly here, at least with respect to the 
fundamental inventory of CDPs, that is, of God, mind, and body. Descartes tells us that 
generating these CDPs and meditating on them need only be engaged once in a lifetime. Once a 
person has done so, she must abstain from meditating on these truths any further because it will 
not epistemically fruitful. Instead, she must keep “in one’s memory and one’s belief the 
conclusions” previously drawn, and focus her attention on thoughts that involve sensation and 
imagination.  
 The passage to Elizabeth seems suggestive of the memory solution, for Descartes claims that 
we should content ourselves with preserving our knowledge in memory. Let us consider the 
memory solution more closely. This is the view of scientia on the memory solution:  
[scientia2]: a judgment, J, is scientia if and only if J is grounded
2 in a occurrent CDP or 
an MCDP. 
 
The memory solution is inspired by Willis Doney’s infamous solution to the Cartesian circle. 
The Cartesian circle is the objection that Descartes offers a circular argument in the Third 
Meditation. Roughly put, the objection runs as follow:. Descartes’ proof for the existence of God 
assumes the truth and indubitability of CDPs. However, Descartes’ proof for the truth and 
indubitability of CDPs presupposes the existence of God. Thus, the argument is circular (AT VII: 
214/CSM II:150).  
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 According to Doney, however, there is no circle because Descartes never doubted the 
reliability of CDPs in the first place. Descartes does not need to rely on God (and his non-
deceptive nature) to secure the reliability of CDPs, rather he needs to rely on God in order to 
secure the infallibility of memory and thus MCDPs. Descartes seems to confirm this view in the 
Fourth Replies:   
when I said that we can know nothing for certain until we are aware that God exists, I 
expressly declared that I was speaking only of knowledge of those conclusions which 
can be recalled when we are no longer attending to the arguments by means of which 
we deduced them. (AT VII 140) 
 
Here, I am not concerned with Doney’s solution to the Cartesian circle, but with how his 
solution can be reconstructed into a solution to PKP. Let us look at some of the texts 
Doney relies on, to see how they can be viewed as a solution to PKP. In the Second 
Replies Descartes tells Mersenne:  
There are other truths which are perceived very clearly by our intellect so long as we 
attend to the arguments on which our knowledge of them depends; and we are 
therefore incapable of doubting them during this time. But we may forget the 
arguments in question and later remember simply the conclusions which were 
deduced from them. The question will now arise as to whether we possess the same 
firm and indubitable conviction concerning these conclusions, when we simply 
recollect that they were previously deduced from quite evident principles (our ability 
to call them ‘conclusions’ presupposes such a recollection). My reply is that the 
required certainty is indeed possessed by those whose knowledge of God enables 
them to understand that the intellectual faculty which he gave them cannot but tend 
towards the truth; but the required certainty is not possessed by others. (AT VII: 146, 
CSM II: 104-105). 
 
Here, Descartes draws a distinction between judgments made during occurrent CDPs, and 
judgments detached from those CDPs. Descartes then raises the very question that is at the heart 
of PKP, namely, “whether we possess the same firm and indubitable conviction concerning these 
conclusions, when we simply recollect that they were previously deduced from quite evident 
principles.” According to Descartes, if one has understood God’s existence and his non-
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deceptive nature, then one will maintain the same firm and indubitable conviction in judgments 
detached from CDPs. This view is articulated again in the Fourth Replies, where Descartes 
clarifies for Arnauld his reply to Mersenne: 
I made a distinction between what we in fact perceive clearly and what we remember having 
perceived clearly on a previous occasion. To begin with, we are sure that God exists because 
we attend to the arguments which prove this; but subsequently it is enough for us to 
remember that we perceived something clearly in order for us to be certain that it is true. This 
would not be sufficient if we did not know that God exists and is not a deceiver (AT VII: 
246/CSM II: 171). 
Descartes tells a similar story in a 1640 letter to Regius:  
A man who has once clearly understood the reasons which convince us that God exists and is 
not a deceiver, provided he remembers the conclusion ‘God is no deceiver’ whether or not he 
continues to attend to the reasons for it, will continue to possess not only the conviction, but 
real knowledge of this and all other conclusions the reasons for which he remembers he once 
clearly perceived. (AT III: 64-65/CSMK: 147) 
For advocates of the memory solution, the extension of the divine guarantee of the veracity of 
CDPs to MCDPs cannot be more explicit. Once one has knowledge of God and his non-
deceptive nature, one need not regenerate CDPs in order to possess scientia; rather, one can 
remember a CDP and still have the same level of certainty in the corresponding detached 
judgments. God guarantees the infallibility of MCDPs, and thus MCDPs can render judgments 
detached from CDPs into scientia.  
I think that these texts—coupled with the 1643 letter to Princess Elizabeth—clearly suggest 
that Descartes has a significant role for memory in his account of scientia. That much is 
undeniable. Indeed, in my dispositionalist solution to PKP, I too will invoke memory. However, 
the memory solution’s understanding of the role of memory, namely, that God guarantees the 
infallibility of memory faces significant problems. According to Doney, memory is fallible, and 
“God must vindicate its use” (1955, 326). However, as Frankfurt objects: “if memory is actually 
fallible, how can it be vindicated, by God or in any other way? If it is really vindicated by God, 
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on the other hand, how can it be fallible?” (2008, 218). The question, then, is whether Descartes 
views memory as fallible. According to John Cottingham, 
If Descartes had claimed that once God’s existence is established the accuracy of our 
memory is guaranteed, then he would be flying in the face of common sense, since it 
is notorious that human memory is weak and fallible. (1986, 77 fn. 25) 
 
Descartes does recognize the fallibility of memory in a few texts. In the Rules, for 
example, Descartes claims that memory is “weak and unstable” (AT X: 408/CSM I: 38). 
Moreover, consider Descartes’ remarks in his Conversation with Burman: 
Burman: Someone, however, may still raise the following objection: after I 
have proved that God exists and is not a deceiver, then I can say that my mind 
certainly does not deceive me, since a reliable mind was God’s gift to me; but my 
memory may still deceive me since I may think I remember something which I do 
not in fact remember. This is because of the weakness of memory. 
 
Descartes: I have nothing to say on the subject of memory. Everyone should test 
himself to see whether he is good at remembering. If he has any doubts on that 
score, then he should make use of written notes and so forth to help him. 
(Conversation with Burman, CSMK: 334) 
 
Burman presents Descartes with a clear opportunity to clarify his stance on memory. If Descartes 
thought that memory was infallible, then presumably he would state as much. However, he 
seems to accept that memory is fallible, claiming that anyone who has doubts about their 
memory should test themselves, and use notes to aid them. 
  
4 The Dispositionalist Solution 
Broadly put, the dispositionalist solution claims that scientia is stabilized through virtuous 
habits of belief. This reading builds on both the regeneration solution and the memory solution. 
For the dispositionalist, habits of belief are created by engaging cognitive routes in order to 
imprint the cognitive routes and judgments made about CDPs into memory. The difference with 
the prior readings is, roughly, as follows. For the dispositionalist, engaging cognitive routes is a 
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practice designed to preserve knowledge in memory. However, it is not mere MCDPs that 
preserve our knowledge, rather it is through a habit of belief that is created vis-à-vis the faculty 
of memory. To unpack this view, we will have to say a bit more about habits of belief, and the 
role of memory in their formation. 
Habits of belief are dispositions to have certain thoughts (Passions III.161 AT XI: 453/CSM 
I: 387). A central goal of Descartes’ philosophical program is to uproot our vicious habits of 
belief based on obscure and confused perceptions, such as those formed during our childhood 
when we were immersed in the senses or those passively acquired from the popular 
Scholasticism of the day, and to replace them with virtuous habits of belief based on clear and 
distinct perceptions (or so I will argue).13 
Let us consider the nature of vicious habits of belief more closely, as it will help clarify their 
counterpart. In Principles I. 71, Descartes says the “first and main cause of all our errors” starts 
in childhood when “the mind was so closely tied to the body that it had no leisure for any 
thoughts except those by means of which it had sensory awareness of what was happening to the 
body.”  In childhood “the mind judged everything in terms of its utility to the body in which it 
was immersed, it assessed the amount of reality in each object by the extent to which it was 
affected by it.” This resulted in the formation of many erroneous judgments; the mind “supposed 
that there was more substance or corporeality in rocks and metals than in water or air, since it felt 
more hardness and heaviness in them.” These erroneous judgments eventually become vicious 
habits of belief:  
right from infancy our mind was swamped with a thousand such preconceived 
opinions; and in later childhood, forgetting that they were adopted without sufficient 
                                               
13 Nolan and Easton also argue that Descartes wants us to replace vicious habits of belief with 
virtuous habits of belief (2016, 349). 
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examination, it regarded them as known by the senses or implanted by nature, and 
accepted them as utterly true and evident (AT VIIIA: 35-6/CSM I: 218-9). 
 
Although Descartes does not explicitly reference habits of belief in this article, it is clear a few 
articles later that he has habits of belief in mind. Descartes writes regarding the cause of our 
errors: “we become tired if we have to attend to things which are not present to the senses; as a 
result, our judgements on these things are habitually based not on present perception but on 
preconceived opinion” (Principles I.73, AT VIIIA: 37/CSM I: 220). 
Although these habitual judgments are produced by the cooperation of the intellect and the 
will, Descartes is clear that the habits of belief are ultimately formed in memory. In Principles I. 
72 Descartes continues:  
In later years the mind is no longer a total slave to the body, and does not refer 
everything to it. Indeed, it inquires into the truth of things considered in themselves, 
and discovers very many of its previous judgments to be false. But despite this, it is 
not easy for the mind to erase these false judgments from its memory; and as long as 
they stick there, they can cause a variety of errors. (AT VIIIA: 36: CSM I: 219-220). 
 
Here, Descartes is clear that these habits of belief are formed in memory. Let us define a vicious 
habit of belief as follows:  
[vicious habit of belief]: a habit of belief, H, is vicious if and only if H is grounded in 
obscure and confused perceptions.14 
 
Let us now turn to virtuous habits of belief. Descartes explicitly claims that the Meditations is 
designed to inculcate virtuous habits of beliefs. These habits of belief are created through 
repeated meditation. One will not have successfully engaged the Meditations by giving it a quick 
                                               
14 Strictly speaking, there are more conditions that need to apply to distinguish a vicious habit of 
belief. A vicious habit of belief could also derive from CDPs. For example, one might have 
CDPs but use the wrong rules of inference. I could have CDPs of individual premises of an 
argument, but commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent. Conversely, a virtuous habit of 
belief must be derived from CDPs and the right rules of inference. 
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read; rather a successful meditation requires weeks or even months. In the Second Replies, 
Descartes writes:  
And I should like my readers not just to take the short time needed to go through 
it, but to devote several months, or at least weeks, to considering the topics dealt 
with, before going on to the rest of the book. If they do this they will undoubtedly 
be able to derive much greater benefit from what follows (AT VII: 130/CSM II: 
94) 
 
Descartes continues, explaining that his method is designed to replace vicious habits of 
belief with virtuous habits of belief: 
The nature of the method is such that scrutinizing it just once is not enough. 
Protracted and repeated study is required to eradicate the lifelong habit of 
confusing things related to the intellect with corporeal things, and to replace it 
with the opposite habit of distinguishing the two; this will take at least a few days 
to acquire (AT VII: 131/CSM II: 94; cf. Seventh Replies, AT VII: 506/CSM II: 
344) 
 
What exactly is a virtuous habit of belief? The clearest statement of a virtuous habit of belief is 
given in the context of Descartes’ theory of virtue. According to Descartes, virtue requires that 
we have knowledge of the truth (Letter to Elizabeth 15 September 1645, AT IV: 291/CSMK: 
265). However, in order to act according to this knowledge of the truth in a moral situation, we 
need to make this knowledge a habit of belief:  
Besides knowledge of the truth, practice is also required if one is to be always 
disposed to judge well. We cannot continually pay attention to the same thing; 
and so, however clear and evident the reason may have been that convinced us of 
some truth in the past, we can later be turned away from believing it by some 
false appearances unless we have so imprinted it on our mind by long and 
frequent meditation that it has become a settled disposition with us. In this sense 
the scholastics are right when they say that virtues are habits; for in fact our 
failings are rarely due to lack of theoretical knowledge of what we should do, but 
to lack of practical knowledge—that is, lack of a firm habit of belief. (AT IV: 
295-6/CSMK: 267)  
 
Though presented in the context of moral deliberation, notice that Descartes argues for the 
inculcation of virtuous habits of belief because of similar considerations that generate PKP. 
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Because we cannot sustain our attention on the truth, we need some way of stabilizing our 
knowledge so we don’t forget to act according to it when we are in a moral situation. Descartes’ 
suggestion is that we frequently meditate on the truth—i.e. clear and distinct perceptions—until 
is imprinted in our mind and has become a settled disposition within us. This suggests that 
Cartesian meditation vis-à-vis the engagement of cognitive routes is not just a way of arriving at 
knowledge, but it is also a way of establishing habits of belief that also stabilize that knowledge. 
By repeatedly engaging cognitive routes to a particular CDP, the content of said CDP can 
become a habit of belief.  
This notion of imprinting knowledge in the mind is presented in the Meditations as well, and 
significantly, is directly linked to memory. At the end of the Second Meditation, for example, 
Descartes famously learns that the nature of the mind is better known than the nature of the body. 
This is a significant discovery, for up until now Descartes had thought that the nature of the body 
was clearly better known than the nature of the mind (a childhood sensory prejudice). Notice 
how Descartes ends the Second Meditation:  
But since the habit of holding on to old opinions cannot be set aside so quickly, I should like 
to stop here and meditate for some time on this new knowledge I have gained, so as to fix it 
more deeply in my memory. (AT VII: 34/CSM II: 23) 
 
Descartes is making it clear to his readers that merely arriving at some new knowledge is not 
sufficient to counteract our prior false beliefs. Since we are so engrained in our sensory prejudice 
and have habits of belief that condition how we see the world and thus do metaphysical inquiry, 
we must actively combat our prior habits of belief by meditating on the truth to form new, 
virtuous habits of belief. Here, Descartes explicitly claims that the new virtuous habit of belief is 
formed in memory.  
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 Descartes makes the connection between a virtuous habit of belief and memory the end of the 
Fourth Meditation as well:  
Admittedly, I am aware of a certain weakness in me, in that I am unable to keep my 
attention fixed on one and the same item of knowledge at all times; but by attentive 
and repeated meditation I am nevertheless able to make myself remember as often as 
the need arises, and thus get into the habit of avoiding error. (AT VII: 62/CSM II: 43) 
 
Descartes once again acknowledges the limitations of his attention, and seeks to remedy this by 
repeated meditation to fix an item of knowledge in memory. Here, the item of knowledge is the 
“truth rule” of the Third Mediation: “I now seem to be able to lay it down as a general rule that 
whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true” (AT VII: 35/CSM II: 24). According to 
Descartes, by frequent and repeated meditation on this rule he will be able to fix it in his memory 
in a way such that he will form the habit of believing it, which will thus prevent him from falling 
into error. Similarly, Descartes writes in the Appendix to the Fifth Objections,  
No matter how much we have resolved not to assert or deny anything, we easily 
forget our resolution afterwards if we have not strongly impressed it on our 
memory; and this is why I suggested that we should think about it very carefully 
(AT IXA: 205/CSM II: 270) 
 
Let us define a virtuous habit of belief as follows: 
 
[virtuous habit of belief]: A habit of belief, H, is virtuous if and only if H is grounded 
in CDPs.15 
 
With these distinctions in hand, a new conception of scientia emerges: 
[scientia3]: A judgment J is scientia if and only if J is grounded in a virtuous habit of 
belief. 
 
 Let us get clear on how scientia3 satisfies the criterion of stability and thus solves PKP. 
Recall, PKP is generated by the fact that we are finite minds. Unlike God, we cannot sustain our 
                                               
15 For a more in depth account of virtuous judgment and habits of belief see Chapter 5 of Vitz 
(2015). The account of virtuous habits of belief presented here is, for the most part, consistent 




attention on CDPs. As finite minds, we are easily distracted by other thoughts, sensations, 
passions, and imaginings (moreover, we are simply forgetful). Descartes has a reasonable 
response to this challenge . If we engage cognitive routes until CDPs become imprinted in our 
memory, we will always have our knowledge ready at hand because we will have a disposition to 
produce scientia. This disposition protects us, under normal circumstances, from forgetting this 
knowledge. And even if we are distracted by other sensations or passions, we are still disposed to 
make the right judgments when the situation demands (even though we may fail from time to 
time).  
Notice how the dispositionalist solution builds on the two prior readings. For the 
dispositionalist, repeated engagement with cognitive routes is essential to forming habits of 
belief. We must repeatedly work through these cognitive routes to imprint CDPs onto memory. 
Indeed, this is arguably why Descartes say we must repeatedly work through the Meditations; we 
won’t reap the benefits of the Meditations through a mere first pass. Like the memory solution, 
memory is a central part of the dispositionalist solution. However, it is not divinely guaranteed 
MCDPs that ground scientia. Rather, it is memory used in a certain way. On this view, memory 
has a preservative function, which if engaged properly, can create virtuous habits of belief that 
can stabilize our knowledge. The problem with the original memory solution is that it suggests 
we need only engage meditation once in order to achieve MCDPs that can secure our knowledge. 
This is an overestimation of God’s guarantee of the non-defective nature of our faculties. God 
does not give a guarantee that memory is reliable tout court; rather, it must be used in the proper 
way. For the dispositionalist, this means that in order to stabilize our knowledge, we have to 




5 Memory and the Defective Nature Doubt  
Let us consider an objection one might raise against this reading of scientia. Recall, the 
standards for scientia in the Meditations are very high. Scientia is indefeasible knowledge. Is it 
really the case, then, that these judgments grounded in virtuous habits of belief meet the 
standards of scientia? The thought here is that in trying to account for stability or preservation, 
the dispositionalist solution has failed to account for truth and absolute certainty. While we now 
have a mechanism—habits of belief—for preserving knowledge, these judgments are merely 
judgments and simply do not amount to scientia. This is because virtuous habits of belief could 
be compromised over time by sensory prejudice or other forms of false content. In short, virtuous 
habits of belief might be subject to the defective nature doubt of the First Meditation. 
 In response, I want to return to Descartes’ discussion of PKP at the end of the Fifth 
Meditation. Recall the first passage we considered in section 1:  
Admittedly my nature is such that so long as I perceive something very clearly and 
distinctly I cannot but believe it to be true. But my nature is also such that I cannot fix 
my mental vision continually on the same thing, so as to keep perceiving it clearly; 
and often the memory of a previously made judgment may come back, when I am no 
longer attending to the arguments which led me to make it. And so other arguments 
can now occur to me which might easily undermine my opinion, as if I were unaware 
of God: and I should thus never have true and certain knowledge about anything, but 
only shifting and changeable opinions. (AT VII: 69-70/CSM II: 48) 
 
Here, Descartes explicitly raises the question at the heart of PKP: do judgments that are no 
longer grounded in CDPs still amount to scientia? Let us now consider Descartes’ Fifth 
Meditation response to PKP: 
Now, however, I have perceived that God exists, and at the same time I have understood 
that everything else depends on him, and that he is no deceiver; and I have drawn the 
conclusion that everything which I clearly and distinctly perceive is of necessity true. 
Accordingly, even if I am no longer attending to the arguments which led me to judge 
that this is true, as long as I remember that I clearly and distinctly perceived it, there are 
no counter-arguments which can be adduced to make me doubt it, but on the contrary I 
have true and certain knowledge of it. And I have knowledge not just of this matter, but 
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of all matters which I remember ever having demonstrated, in geometry and so on. For 
what objections can now be raised? That the way I am made makes me prone to frequent 
error? But I now know that I am incapable of error in those cases where my 
understanding is transparently clear. Or can it be objected that I have in the past regarded 
as true and certain many things which I afterwards recognized to be false? But none of 
these were things which I clearly and distinctly perceived: I was ignorant of this rule for 
establishing the truth, and believed these things for other reasons which I later discovered 
to be less reliable. (ibid.) 
 
Descartes’ response is as follows. Once it has been established that God exists and that he is 
not a deceiver, I can have certainty that my faculties are—in normal circumstances—reliable. 
As Descartes writes in the Second Replies: “Since God is the supreme being, he must also be 
supremely good and true, and it would therefore be a contradiction that anything should be 
created by him which positively tends toward falsehood” (AT VII: 144/CSM II: 103). This 
means that so long as we use our faculties correctly (be it the intellect or memory), we can 
have confidence that we are tracking the truth. Thus, I no longer need to doubt the reliability 
of my past CDPs, nor do I need to doubt my memories that I had said perceptions.16 As such, 
I do not need to constantly regenerate past CDPs. To see this, compare the epistemic 
situation of the “theist geometer” with that of the “atheist geometer”: 
The fact that an atheist can be ‘clearly aware that the three angles of a triangle are equal 
to two right angles’ is something I do not dispute. But I maintain that this awareness of 
his is not true knowledge, since no act of awareness that can be rendered doubtful seems 
fit to be called knowledge. Now since we are supposing that this individual is an atheist, 
he cannot be certain that he is not being deceived on matters which seem to him to be 
very evident (as I fully explained). And although this doubt may not occur to him, it can 
still crop up if someone else raises the point or if he looks into the matter himself. So he 
will never be free of this doubt until he acknowledges that God exists. (Second Replies, 
AT VII: 141/CSM II: 101) 
 
                                               
16 What is the scope of scientia? I take a wide reading, that is, scientia does not just include 
fundamental metaphysical truths. But it extends to any propositions that can be grounded in 
CDPs (e.g. other metaphysical truths and mathematics). Science and ethics, however, must be 
excluded as Descartes suggests that we cannot have absolute certainty in these fields—we can 
only have moral certainty. 
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The atheist geometer is capable of clearly and distinctly perceiving a theorem. However, 
when she loses the CDP of the theorem, she is subject to the defective nature doubt. That is, 
she can indirectly doubt the truth of the CDP, or even whether she had a CDP at all. The 
theist geometer is not subject to the defective nature doubt because she knows that God’s 
non-deceptive nature guarantees the reliability of her intellect and memory. Thus, when she 
exits the CDP, she can still be certain of the truth of the CDP, and that she had the CDP. 
To be sure, Descartes is not claiming, as the advocates of the memory solution would 
have it, that there is a divine guarantee of memory. Rather, the claim is that the hyperbolic 
doubts about memory are no longer intelligible, because it is not the case that memory is 
prone to frequent error.  Given that God exists and that he is not a deceiver, I can assume that 
my memory is reliable about my past intellectual achievements.17 That Descartes believes 
memory is reliable is also confirmed at the end of the Sixth Meditation, when he discharges 
the dreaming doubt: 
I now notice that there is a vast difference between the two, in that dreams are never 
linked by memory with all the other actions of life as waking experiences are. If, while I 
am awake, anyone were suddenly to appear to me and then disappear immediately, as 
happens in sleep, so that I could not see where he had come from or where he had gone 
to, it would not be unreasonable for me to judge that he was a ghost, or a vision created in 
my brain, rather than a real man. But when I distinctly see where things come from and 
where and when they come to me, and when I can connect my perceptions of them with 
the whole of the rest of my life without a break, then I am quite certain that when I 
encounter these things I am not asleep but  And I ought not to have even the slightest 
doubt of their reality if, after calling upon all the senses as well as my memory and my 
intellect in order to check them, I receive no conflicting reports from any of these 
sources. For from the fact that God is not a deceiver it follows that in cases like these I 
am completely free from error. (AT VII: 89-90/CSM II: 61-2). 
 
                                               
17 Veroniqué Foti similarly argues that even if memory is weak, this does not pose a problem for 
scientia: “Descartes states in the Second Replies that, given knowledge of God, one may even 
forget the arguments for a conclusion one remembers having demonstrated without jeopardizing 
one’s ‘firm and immutable conviction’ as to its truth. The weakness of memory can thus be 
admitted without endangering scientia” (2000, 600). 
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If Descartes thought that memory was defective, then he would not be able to discharge the 
dreaming doubt by appealing to the intellect and the senses alone. Descartes needs memory to be 
reliable to successfully complete the Meditations, and what allows him to do so is his having 
established that God is not a deceiver. The upshot for the reading on offer is that because 
memory is reliable, it is safe to assume that the habits of belief that I establish vis-à-vis memory 
will—in normal circumstances—preserve the truth and certainty that the original judgments 
grounded in CDPs had.  
There is one last worry one might have about my account of the reliability of memory, 
namely, that I have simply repackaged the original memory solution. The objection is that there 
doesn't seem to be a significant epistemic distinction between MCDPs being infallible and being 
reliable, and thus scientia is ultimately stabilized through MCDPs. In response, I think that we 
need to read Descartes' remarks about memory in his discussion of scientia against the more 
subtle account of memory I have drawn out from the Meditations, namely, that it is through 
repeated engagement with cognitive routes that memory can reliably regenerate the contents of 
CDPs. Although memory is reliable, a mere memory based off one generation of a CDP might 
not be accurate. We might indeed misremember the CDP. As Descartes admits in the Rules, there 
is a sense in which memory is “weak and unstable.” However, as Descartes goes on to explain in 
the context of his account of enumeration or induction, memory can be strengthened through 
“continuous and repeated movement of thought” (AT X: 408/CSM I: 38), and this is why the 
certainty of induction “depends on memory” (AT X: 408/CSM I: 37). Similarly, my claim is that 
memory has to be utilized in a certain way to stabilize scientia. In short, there is a significant 
distinction between the sense of reliability of memory I have developed, and the infallibility of 
memory invoked by the memory solution. 
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6 The Cartesian Circle Revisited 
How does the dispositionalist solution to PKP square with solutions to the Cartesian circle? 
There have been many attempted solutions to the Cartesian circle, and I will not be able to 
address each of them here. However, I want to examine briefly one prominent solution, that of 
Newman and Nelson, and show that the dispositionalist solution does not conflict with their 
view, but actually supplements their reading of scientia.  
Recall, the Cartesian circle is the objection that Descartes commits circular reasoning in the 
Third and Fourth Meditations. The circle consists of the following two arcs: (1) Descartes is 
certain that God exists because he is certain that his CDPs are true and (2) Descartes is certain 
that his CDPs are true because he is certain that God exists. The memory response solves the 
Cartesian circle by essentially restricting the scope of doubt in the Meditations. This is grounds 
exemption. On this view, Descartes’ doubt is not hyperbolic because there are a class of 
perceptions that are always assumed to be indubitable and true, namely, CDPs. Thus, we do not 
need God to vindicate CDPs, rather we need the existence of a non-deceptive God to secure 
memory, that is, MCDPs. The memory response, then, rejects the second arc of the Cartesian 
circle, namely, that Descartes is certain that his CDPs are true because he is certain that God 
exists. Newman and Nelson resist this strategy, arguing that Descartes’ doubt is fully hyperbolic: 
all perceptions—CDPs in particular—are subject to the skeptical doubt of the First Meditation. 
More specifically, the skeptical doubts of the First Meditation call into question the very 
reliability of our faculties. The skeptical doubts shows that even when I am in my best cognitive 
states—a state of clear and distinct perception—I may still be in error.  
Newman and Nelson offer a more subtle reading of the two arcs of the Cartesian circle: 
(1*) I am certain that God exists only because (I am certain that p, if I clearly and 




(2*) (I am certain that the C&D Rule is perfectly reliable, if I clearly and distinctly 
attend to it and its proof) only because I am certain that God exists. (1999, 381) 
 
The C&D Rule is the “truth rule” mentioned above, namely, that I can be certain that clear and 
distinct perceptions are always true. Newman and Nelson’s solution is complex, but their main 
insight is to provide the meditator with grounds enhancement. More specifically, they argue for a 
way to access the C&D rule in a self-evident intuition, instead of a proof: 
the meditator’s ground of assent to the divine guarantee is enhanced from mere 
demonstrative clarity and distinctness, to self-evident, axiomatic, intuitive, clarity and 
distinctness. As a consequence, during moments of attention his bottom-most 
epistemic ground is his understanding that the C&D Rule is grounded in the ultimate 
divine ground; the truth of the divine guarantee is evident in itself, rather than resting 
on premises that are epistemically more basic. (.ibid 386) 
 
Newman and Nelson claim that in the Fifth Meditation, Descartes achieves an intuition that 
involves both the existence of God and the reliability of the C&D rule. Significantly, this 
intuition does not rest on any proof, like the Third Meditation proof for the existence of God, but 
is self-evident: “when one has a readily accessible cognition of God that is due and sufficient to 
resist hyperbolic doubt, it conceptually contains a recognition of the divine guarantee of the 
C&D Rule” (ibid. 389). Hyperbolic doubt is thus discharged because every skeptical hypothesis 
becomes self-defeating in the face of a self-evident and assent-compelling intuition of the C&D 
Rule (ibid., 390-1). Unlike the Third Meditation proof, any attempt to formulate hyperbolic 
doubt in the face of a self-evident intuition of God and the C&D Rule is automatically 
defeasible. 
 Newman and Nelson are effectively trying to secure the foundational grounds for scientia, by 
establishing how the grounds of scientia—i.e. the existence of God and the reliability of the 
C&D Rule—are indefeasible. As far as I can tell, the dispositionalist account of scientia does not 
conflict with their interpretation. The dispositionalist does not require us to limit the scope of 
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hyperbolic doubt, nor does it preclude the possibility that one can have a simultaneous intuition 
of God’s existence and the C&D Rule. However, Newman and Nelson do have doubts about “the 
accumulation of items of scientia at the object level” (ibid. 392), doubts which are grounded in 
questions about memory. Their worry is that items of scientia depend on CDP’s of their 
corresponding proofs, and when our attention lapses away from the proof, we can question the 
veracity of our memory and whether we had the CDP. 
 My response to this worry is two-fold. First, as I argued at the end of the previous section, 
God’s non-deceptive nature guarantees that our faculties tend toward the truth – we are not 
“prone to frequent error”. This implies that our memory is reliable. As such, we can have 
confidence in the reports our memory makes about past CDPs. This point ultimately comes down 
to how serious one takes the texts about the reliability of memory, and Newman and Nelson 
might not buy into my reading of the texts. However, there is a second point that I think Newman 
and Nelson might concede. Newman and Nelson’s argument that the C&D Rule can become 
self-evident rests on the claim that this self-evident intuition is made possible through repeated 
meditation. Through repeated engagement of a proof, the conclusion of the proof can become 
transparent and self-evident to the meditator: 
By analogy, considering that our beginning logic students may need, initially, to work 
hard to understand the significant difference between affirming the antecedent and 
affirming the consequent; by the end of the term—after repeated, reflective meditation—
many of these same students begin pounding their fists, along with us, that nothing is 
more obvious than modus ponens. (ibid. 388) 
 
The thought here is quite similar to the view I have developed, namely, that scientia must be 
grounded in virtuous habits of belief. Indeed, Newman and Nelson cite some of the same texts 
about habits of belief to justify their claim about the possibility of self-evident intuitions (See AT 
IV: 295-6/CSMK: 267). I propose that one way of viewing the process of establishing virtuous 
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habits of belief—that is repeated engagement with cognitive routes to a CDP—is that the 
resultant judgments become self-evident.18 While I do not think that my view of scientia requires 
this further point, we can modulate it so that it is amenable to Newman and Nelson’s reading of 
scientia. In short, I think that the dispositionalist account of scientia is consistent with Newman 
and Nelson’s solution to the Cartesian circle, and under a certain light, can be viewed as an 
extension of their account of scientia. 
 
7 Conclusion 
 In this paper I have attempted to draw attention to a feature of scientia that has not been duly 
appreciated by commentators, namely, the stability of scientia. We considered two possible 
solutions to PKP—the regeneration solution and the memory solution—and have seen that while 
they pick up on features of Descartes’ considered view, they ultimately fall short. I have argued 
for an alternative view, the dispositionalist solution, which argues that scientia is stabilized 
through virtuous habits of belief. These are habits of belief grounded in CDPs, and formed 
through memory. Beyond solving PKP, this view is attractive because it can explain Descartes’ 
frequent appeals to memory in his account of scientia, without relying on the problematic 





                                               
18 Mathew Homan (2018) has recently argued that symbols and written notes can help strengthen 
memory, which can help us progress from foundational scientia to scientia at the object level. I 
think this view of memory is consistent with the view developed here, although I would say that 
such aids can help strengthen memory in the development of virtuous habits of belief.  
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5    CONCLUSION 
 
In this dissertation I have tried to make headway towards understanding Descartes’ 
ethics, particularly the moral system that he envisions in the image of the tree of philosophy. In 
what follows, I will explain how each question has been answered, and piece together the overall 
interpretation of Descartes’ ethics that I have developed. 
The first question I have addressed is the following: what is the relationship between the 
virtue of generosity and the rest of Descartes’ philosophical system? At first glance, a plausible 
reading based on the tree of philosophy is that generosity would be a fruit of the tree, and thus 
presupposes the philosophical fields that come before it. However, as we have seen, some 
commentators have argued that the virtue of generosity is the so-called “seed” of Descartes’ 
philosophical system by being fundamental to Descartes’ metaphysics and epistemology in the 
Meditations. Lisa Shapiro has argued that generosity is central to the Fourth Meditation, and 
Omri Boehm has argued that generosity is foundational to the cogito in the Second Meditation. 
 I have argued for the claim that generosity—the chief virtue in Descartes’ ethics—is 
indeed a fruit of philosophy. In particular, it presupposes knowledge of metaphysics, 
epistemology, and physics (the roots and trunk of philosophy).1 The central move of my 
argument has been that generosity presupposes knowledge of the mind-body distinction, which is 
not available to the meditator in the Second Meditation or Fourth Meditation. This is because the 
first component of generosity states that the only thing that truly belongs to oneself is free will. 
In the Second and Fourth Meditation, however, the meditator has yet to distinguish the body 
from her mind, and thus it is still a possibility that the body could be fundamental to the nature of 
                                               
1 Strictly speaking, the tree of philosophy would imply that generosity also presupposes 
knowledge of mechanics and medicine. Descartes, however, never spells out how this is 
supposed to work, and I have not ventured to sketch an account in this dissertation.  
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her self. Indeed, in the Fourth Meditation the meditator considers this exact possibility, and is not 
yet in a position to deny it. Moreover, Descartes’ method for acquiring generosity requires that 
one meditate on the actions of other mind-body composites in order to understand the advantages 
and disadvantages that come from using the will well or poorly. In the Meditations, however, the 
meditator is not yet aware of the existence of other people and thus cannot engage in such a 
reflection. Generosity, then, cannot be acquired until one successfully completes the Meditations, 
and completes further reflections on her fundamental nature. 
 The second question I have addressed is the following: What is the metaphysical nature 
of Cartesian virtue, and does Cartesian virtue allow for the possibility of moral knowledge? As 
we say in the first chapter, Descartes distinguishes the virtue of generosity, and provides a 
unique two component definition of generosity. Descartes also distinguishes other virtues as 
well, such as courage and humility. However, Descartes also offers a universal definition of 
virtue, arguing that virtue consists of the firm and constant resolution to use the will well or the 
disposition to judge well. Prima facie, then, there is a tension in Descartes’ virtue theory. On the 
one hand, there is a complex account of virtue where there are distinct kinds of virtue. On the 
other hand, there is a simple account of virtue, where there is only one virtue, i.e. the disposition 
to judge well.  
 I argue that this is not an ultima facie tension. Though Descartes distinguishes different 
types of virtue, what he is ultimately trying to do is articulate a unique version of the unity of the 
virtues thesis. In particular, he advances a version of the unity of the virtues thesis where all the 
virtues are identical to each other and thus reducible to the same nature (“the identify of the 
virtues” thesis). This fundamental nature is the disposition to judge well. The different virtues, 
for Descartes, are distinguished at a conceptual level according to the different objects to which 
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they apply. Courage and generosity, for example, fundamentally consist of the firm and constant 
resolution to use the will well. However, we can distinguish them because these virtues are 
manifested in different types of moral situations. Courage may be exemplified on the battlefield, 
whereas generosity may be exemplified in one’s interactions with the less fortunate. Nonetheless, 
both virtues are tokens of the same type of disposition. 
 This reading of the unity of the virtues has interesting implications for Descartes’ moral 
epistemology. Descartes grounds virtue in “knowledge of the truth.” This knowledge ranges 
from items in metaphysics, physics, to society and politics. However, not all of these truths can 
be grounded in clear and distinct perceptions. For example, Descartes third truth is that we must 
know the physics of Principles III. However, the physical principles therein cannot have the 
level of certainty of the truths established, for example, in the Meditations. Descartes also claims 
in the fourth truth that we must recognize that we are parts of our community, society, and the 
universe. However, this “truth” does not meet the standards of knowledge outlined in the 
Meditations either. Perhaps Descartes is not being rigorous. But another possibility is that 
Descartes is shifting the standards of knowledge. The requirement of indefeasibility for 
metaphysics may not apply in the context of moral deliberation. Indeed, Descartes distinguishes 
a different kind of certainty for our practical judgments, namely, moral certainty. While moral 
certainty is not indefeasible like metaphysical or absolute certainty, Descartes does think such 
certainty is sufficient for the conduct of life. I argue that if our practical judgments do meet 
moral certainty, Descartes would accept that such judgments amount to moral knowledge.  
 The first two chapters considered how Descartes’ ethics is systematically grounded in his 
metaphysics and epistemology. The view I have developed is that Descartes’ ethics is grounded 
in his metaphysics and epistemology in virtue of his ethics—virtue in particular—presupposing 
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knowledge of metaphysics and epistemology. In the last chapter, I take a different approach to 
understanding the systematicity of Descartes’ ethics. The third question I have addressed is the 
following: Does Descartes’ ethics inform his metaphysics or epistemology? I argue that 
Descartes’ virtue theory informs his account of perfect knowledge or scientia. Traditionally, 
scientia, has been understand as a judgment that is true and absolutely certain. I argue, however, 
that there is a third condition that scientia must meet, namely, stability.  
There is a unique problem that arises when trying to account for the stability of scientia, 
namely, the problem of knowledge preservation. The problem is that the source of a judgment’s 
truth and absolute certainty is the clear and distinct perception it is grounded in. However, clear 
and distinct perceptions are temporally indexed, momentary mental states. What is the epistemic 
status of a judgment then, when our attention lapses and we lose the clear and distinct perception 
it was once grounded in? In the literature, one can find two solutions to the problem of 
knowledge preservation. The regeneration solution argues that we must become better at 
regenerating clear and distinct perceptions vis-à-vis cognitive routes, so that we can reground a 
judgment in a clear and distinct perception whenever needed. The memory solution argues that 
so long as we remember having a clear and distinct perception (a memory of a clear and distinct 
perception) our judgment maintains that status of scientia even if it is no longer grounded in the 
corresponding clear and distinct perception. 
 I argue that both solutions are problematic, though they pick up on features of Descartes’ 
considered view. Drawing from both solutions, I argue that the right solution is that scientia is 
stabilized or preserved through virtuous habits of belief. Here, I draw on Descartes’ account of 
virtue as a habit of belief. The thought here is that we stabilize scientia type judgments by 
transforming them into habits of belief. These habits of belief preserve truth and absolute 
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certainty because they are formed through repeated engagement of cognitive routes (i.e. routes 
that terminate in clear and distinct perceptions), which grounds these habits of belief in memory. 
This explains why Descartes talks about cognitive routes and memory in the texts on scientia, 
particularly in the context of the Cartesian circle.  
 The main upshot of my interpretation of Descartes’ ethical views is that Descartes was a 
systematic moral thinker. First and foremost, Descartes’ ethics is systematic in and of itself: he 
identifies several fundamental moral concepts out of which he builds a coherent moral 
philosophy. His theory of virtue, for example, informs his account of happiness, goodness, and 
the passions. Descartes’ ethics is also systematic in that it is informed by and informs the rest of 
his philosophy. Descartes did not develop his ethics in isolation from his mature metaphysics and 
epistemology. As my interpretation of Cartesian generosity shows, for example, generosity is 
grounded in knowledge of the real distinction between mind and body. Moreover, virtue in 
general is grounded in knowledge of other Cartesian truths, as account for in the “knowledge of 
the truth” texts. However, Descartes’ ethics also informs his metaphysics and epistemology. As I 
have argued, Descartes’ virtue theory informs his theory of scientia. This point might seem odd, 
given that Descartes’ mature views on virtue were developed after the Meditations. However, 
Descartes’ virtue theory was present much earlier than the Meditations, as evidenced in the 
provisional morality of the Discourse. The second maxim of the discourse provides the outlines 
of Descartes’ virtue theory. Moreover, one can see that Descartes is developing an account of 
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